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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). Prior 
to transfer, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
3-102(3)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly rule that issues of fact exist as to 
Gonzalez's negligence claims against Russell Sorensen under the 
principles summarized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384? 
Standard of review: The denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
reviewed de novo. Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. hers, 2005 UT App 519, ^  9, 128 P.3d 74. 
Preservation: This issue was raised below in the parties' briefing on 
summary judgment (R. 842, R. 1029), and at oral argument (R. 2219 and Exh. 2 hereto 
(7/21/10 Tr.)).1 
Issue 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that Russell 
Sorensen was sufficiently on notice of Gonzalez's negligence 
claim? 
Standard of review: The Utah Supreme Court has not expressly identified 
the standard of review of a trial court's determination of fair notice under U.R.Civ.P. 
8(a), particularly when such determination occurs mid-litigation. The court has applied 
an abuse of discretion standard regarding the pleading of affirmative defenses under 
U.R.Civ.P. 8(c), which must be pled in "short and plain terms." See Cheney v. Rucker, 
1
 Both parties have cited to the July 21, 2010, hearing transcript. See, e.g., Brief of 
Appellant, p. 5 (citing R. 2219). However, it appears that the reporter may have 
inadvertently filed only the first page of the transcript. See R. 2219. For the Court's 
convenience, a full copy of the transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing evidence at trial allegedly inconsistent with defendant's answer). 
Appellee Gonzalez submits that the correct standard under Rule 8(a) is also abuse 
of discretion, the standard applied to the identical Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). 5 
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1217 (3d 
ed. 2002) (under Rule 8(a), "what is the proper length and level of clarity for a pleading 
cannot be defined with any great precision and is largely a matter that is left for the 
discretion of the trial court, which will be reversed by the court of appeals only if that 
discretion is abused"); U.S. ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 
1167 (10th Cir. 2010), and cases cited; see also Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 54, U 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947 ("Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially 
similar' to the federal rules."). 
Preservation: Sorensen did not preserve this issue, as it was not raised 
below until its reply memorandum. State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a): 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in 
the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is a claim for personal injuries arising when the plaintiff, Jose M. Gonzalez, 
came into contact with a live electrical wire while installing soffit. Gonzalez filed an 
initial complaint on September 26, 2008 (R. 1), and an amended complaint on January 
22, 2009. (R. 126.) 
After the close of discovery, including 14 liability depositions (R. 390, 393, 397, 
405, 409, 414, 501, 513, 558, 561, 581, 614), defendant Russell Sorensen filed a motion 
for summary judgment as to Gonzalez's claims against it. (R. 759.) Gonzalez filed an 
opposing memorandum (R. 825), and Sorensen filed a reply memorandum (R. 1029). 
The trial court held oral argument on July 21, 2010 (R. 1564), and on July 30, 
2010, issued a memorandum decision denying Sorensen's motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 1585, attached hereto as Exh. 1.) Sorensen timely petitioned for interlocutory review, 
which this Court granted. 
2
 Third-party defendant John Clayton also filed an opposition to Sorensen's motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 769.) Sorensen filed a motion to strike Clayton's opposition (R. 
1009), and a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Clayton for having filed the opposition, 
and also for opposing the motion to strike. (R. 1411.) Clayton filed a motion to intervene 
as an immune party (R. 1426), which Sorensen opposed as well. (R. 1522.) The trial 
court denied Sorensen's Rule 11 motion and granted the motion to intervene (R. 1832), 
mooting Sorensen's motion to strike Clayton's opposition. Gonzalez adopted the factual 
allegations in Clayton's opposition. (R. 2219 (Exh. 2), p. 23.) 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statement of Facts 
On June 22, 2007, plaintiff and appellee Jose M. Gonzalez was injured when he 
came into contact with high-voltage power lines at a construction site in Midvale, Utah. 
(R.3-4.) 
At the time of the incident, Gonzalez was an employee of John Clayton 
Construction ("Clayton"), a subcontractor hired to perform siding, soffit and fascia on 
Building No. 4. (R. 855-856; R. 956.) (Soffit is "the underside of a part or member of a 
building (as of an overhang or staircase), especially the intrados of an arch." Webster's 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987).) 
Appellant and defendant Russell Sorensen Construction ("Sorensen") was the 
general contractor for the development of the Property and for the Project. (R. 3 f 13; R. 
128 U 14; R. 163 U 14; R. 654 % 1; R. 669 % 19; R. 919, 924.) Sorensen was on the job 
every day, "at least every day, if—and multiple times during the day." (R. 296.) "As 
general contractor [Sorensen] was responsible for general oversight and general 
supervision of the overall construction of the Property." (R. 665 f 10.) 
More than a year before Gonzalez's accident, PacifiCorp d/b/a Rocky Mountain 
Power installed live, 7,200-volt overhead power lines in the area where Gonzalez was 
later assigned to install soffit on Building No. 4. (R. 966-969 (lines at location by 
February 2006).) 
3
 Throughout the litigation, the parties have defined "the Property" as "the property 
located at 7590 Orchard Vista Court," and "the Project" as "the construction project 
located at 7590 Orchard Vista Court." {E.g., R. 619, 1704.) 
4 
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Several other subcontractors also worked on Building No. 4, including plumbers, 
framers, and roofers. (R. 927-931.) Defendant R.M. Rees Construction d/b/a Design 
Stone Creations (hereinafter "Rees") was a subcontractor that did stucco work on the 
building. (R. 928-929; see also R. 110.) 
The National Electric Safety Code ("NESC") specifies minimum horizontal and 
vertical clearances for building walls and projections. Horizontal clearance must be at 
least 7.5 feet. Vertical clearance from roofs and projections on the building must be at 
least 12.5 feet. (R. 908; and citations therein.) 
Gonzalez adduced evidence that Building No. 4, which contained units 12 & 13, 
was constructed by Sorensen in violation of both clearance requirements, in that it was 
constructed within 5.67 feet horizontally and within 8.5 feet vertically of the power line. 
(R. 908; R. 981; see also R. 913.) 
On the north side of Building No. 4, another subcontractor (Rees) set up 
scaffolding to perform stucco work on the building. (R. 899; R. 998.) The scaffolding 
was approximately 37 inches from the power lines. (R. 885; R. 907; see also R. 913; R. 
916; R. 997-998.) 
Sorensen knew that, in order to do work on the north side of Building No. 4, 
workers would have to come within 10 feet or less of the live power lines. (R. 949.) 
Sorensen knew that OSHA regulations prohibited workers from working within 10 feet of 
high voltage electrical lines. (R. 923; see also R. 979-980; R. 986; R. 992.) 
Sorensen knew that, if subcontractors would be working within 10 feet of the 
power line, Rocky Mountain Power should be contacted. (R. 951-952.) Sorensen knew 
5 
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that Rocky Mountain Power could shut down the power lines, or that a contractor could 
put a blanket or sleeve on the lines. (R. 945.) Sorensen did not contact Rocky Mountain 
Power to let it know of any work on the north side of the building. (R. 951.) 
Clayton had previously performed soffit and fascia work on the three other 
buildings in the development. (R. 957-958.) On Friday, June 22, 2007, Clayton's 
foreman assigned Gonzalez to perform soffit work on the north side of Building No. 4. 
(R. 862, 865.) Clayton had worked on building No. 4 for the previous two days. (R. 
859-860.) 
Clayton had used Rees' scaffolding on other occasions (R. 962), and Gonzalez 
used the scaffolding already set up by Rees on the north side of Building No. 4. (R. 860-
861; 863-864.) Gonzalez climbed the scaffolding with his tools and four sections of 
aluminum "J channel" material. (R. 717; R. 866.) As he moved the mold, it either 
struck the energized line or came within sufficient proximity for electricity to arc from 
the line to the J channel. Gonzalez received an electrical shock and fell 18 feet onto a 
fence before hitting the ground. (R. 111-112; R. 882-884; R. 886; R. 898.) 
Gonzalez's original complaint included, inter alia, the following allegations of 
negligence by Sorensen: 
* * * 
23. Defendants did not give Plaintiff any warning of the dangerous 
power lines and their close proximity to the site where Plaintiffs work was to be 
performed and/or affirmatively or constructively notified him that it was safe to 
work on the scaffolding. 
6 
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24. Defendants failed to have the power turned off or protective barriers 
installed around the power lines prior to allowing persons to work in close 
proximity to the power lines. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
26. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all prior paragraphs, as though 
restated and fully set forth herein. 
27. Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiff by, among other 
things: 
a. Failing to properly exercise and maintain a place of 
employment, which was free from recognized hazards that were likely to 
cause death or serious physical harm to individuals working on the 
Property; 
* * * 
c. Failing to ensure that the development of the Property did not 
encroach upon the electrical lines lining the Property, or that proper safety 
measures regarding power lines were followed, including cutting off power 
to the electrical lines, insulating the electrical lines and protecting the 10 
foot safety circle;. . . . 
g. Allowing people to work on improperly constructed 
scaffolding and/or scaffolding erected less than 10 feet away from 
operative, high-voltage electrical lines when they knew or should have 
known that it was dangerous and unsafe to do so. 
h. Allowing individuals to work on the unsafe scaffolding and 
within 10 feet of the power lines when they knew or should have known it 
was unsafe to do so. 
(Bold heading in original.) Similar allegations were contained in the January 2009 
amended complaint. (R. 129-131, ^ 24-25, 28(a, c, h, i).) 
Neither the original nor the amended complaint asserts a cause of action for 
vicarious liability or retained control against Sorensen. (R. 1 and R. 126,passim.) 
7 
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Sorensen has taken the position in the litigation that Clayton's workers were 
"trespassers" at the time of the accident, because they allegedly were not scheduled to do 
soffit work that day (R. 1364), although Sorensen admits that it never told Clayton's 
workers not to come to the site on Friday (June 22, 2007). (R. 859-860; see also R. 942; 
R. 960-961.) Sorensen maintains that it had "shut down" the site to "all subcontractors" 
on the day of the accident, and that Gonzalez did not have Sorensen's "consent" to be on 
the premises. (R. 941-943; R. 655 \ 4; R. 656 f 7; R. 666-667 | 12; R. 686-687, pp. 80-
82:18-11; R. 688, pp. 86-88:20-14; and R. 1455-1457.) (It is undisputed, however, that 
other subcontractors were doing work on other buildings that day. (R. 862.) In a 
separate ruling, the trial court found that issues of fact exist as to whether Clayton had a 
right to be working on the property at the time of the accident. (R. 1832).) 
After the accident, Rocky Mountain Power relocated the power lines and sent a 
bill to Sorensen for the cost of doing so. (R. 946-947; R. 1000.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied Sorensen's motion for summary judgment. 
Sorensen's motion was based entirely upon a contention that Gonzalez cannot meet the 
elements of a "retained control" claim, but that concept applies only to claims of 
vicarious liability, which Gonzalez is not asserting against Sorensen. Under Magana v. 
Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143, it would have been error for the trial 
court to apply retained control principles to a claim of direct negligence. 
The court properly concluded that Gonzalez's negligence claim is cognizable 
because Utah would recognize the principles of liability summarized in the Restatement 
8 
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(Second) of Torts § 384. Under that section, a party who exercises control over premises 
is subject to the same duties and defenses as an owner or possessor of the premises. 
Defendant Sorensen admits that it exercised control over the entire job site, including the 
specific area in which plaintiff Gonzalez was working at the time of the incident. Under 
Utah law, workers such as Gonzalez are business invitees, and thus Sorensen owed 
Gonzalez a duty not to create, or permit to remain, unreasonably dangerous conditions on 
the site. 
Sorensen's arguments against application of Section 384 are unavailing. Courts 
and commentators widely recognize Section 384's adoption. Further, a number of courts 
(including the Utah Supreme Court) have applied premises liability principles to general 
contractors without expressly invoking Section 384. 
Premises liability is not inconsistent with the general rule of non- liability for the 
negligence of independent contractors; in fact, Sorensen admits that landowners are 
subject to both the same general rule of non-liability and premises liability. Public policy 
is not served by subjecting potentially distant or ignorant landowners to liability for 
hazards created or tolerated by general contractors on site. 
The duties applicable under Section 384 are only the basic reasonableness 
requirements set forth in Restatement §§ 343-343A and surrounding sections. Contrary 
to Sorensen's assertions, Gonzalez does not assert any duty by a general contractor to 
supervise the method or manner of subcontractors' work, or to remedy "all known or 
knowable" dangers, or with respect to risks inherent in the work itself. The Utah 
Supreme Court has properly concluded that no such duties should be imposed. But 
9 
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encountering live power lines unreasonably close to a work area has nothing to do with 
the method or manner of installing soffit, and was not inherent in Gonzalez's work -
indeed, all subcontractors working in the area were exposed to the same hazard. 
Applying premises liability principles to Gonzalez's claim, the trial court correctly 
found issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Gonzalez adduced evidence that 
Sorensen created the dangerous condition (erecting Building No. 4 too close to live 
wires), and/or allowed the condition to remain unabated for more than a year, knowing 
that workers were being exposed to it. 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Sorensen was 
sufficiently on notice of Gonzalez's claim. Although Sorensen accuses Gonzalez of 
"recharacterizing" his claim from retained control to premises liability, there is no 
retained control / vicarious liability claim in the complaint to begin with. The complaint 
plainly states that Gonzalez's negligence claims are based upon "hazards . . . on the 
Property," a classic premises liability claim. Although Sorensen argues that Gonzalez 
should have alleged that Sorensen was an owner or possessor of the land, that would have 
been erroneous: Under Section 384, the contractor is not transformed into an owner or 
possessor, but rather is subject to the same duties and defenses as those persons. 
The factual predicate of Gonzalez's claim has never varied: Over the ensuing two 
years, 14 liability depositions have been taken (including that of Sorensen's principal), all 
of which focused on the creation, maintenance, and knowledge of the hazardous 
condition. In construing the complaint and surrounding circumstances liberally, as 
required by Utah Supreme Court precedent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND ISSUES OF FACT ON 
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST SORENSEN. 
A. Plaintiffs direct negligence claims are not subject to "retained 
control" principles, which apply only to claims of vicarious 
liability. 
The sole argument raised in defendant Sorensen's motion for summary judgment 
was that plaintiff Gonzalez could not meet the elements of a claim under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 409 and 414 (1965), the "retained control" doctrine. See Thompson 
v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322. Gonzalez had no dispute with that proposition -
because he is not asserting a retained control claim. 
The retained control doctrine only has application to claims of vicarious liability; 
it is irrelevant to claims that a defendant was itself negligent. The Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated this basic distinction in Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215 
P.3d 143. In Magana, the trial court and this Court both ruled that a worker's claims 
against a general contractor were barred because the plaintiff could not show retained 
control under Thompson, even though the plaintiff was also asserting a separate 
negligence claim against the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed. 
In a section titled "THE RETAINED CONTROL DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
IMMUNIZE A CONTRACTOR FROM ITS OWN NEGLIGENT ACTS," the Supreme Court 
held that this Court's affirmance of summary judgment was error "because it only 
considered Magana's negligence claim under the retained control doctrine. The court 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
failed to separately consider Magana's claim under the direct negligence theory that 
Magana also advanced." Id. \ 36. The court explained: 
The retained control doctrine is separate and distinct from a direct 
negligence theory. Specifically, the retained control doctrine does not 
apply when a plaintiff alleges that an employer's own actions were 
negligent. Rather, the doctrine is limited to circumstances where the 
plaintiff alleges that the employer of a contractor is liable for the 
contractor's negligence because the employer retained sufficient control 
over the contractor's actions to owe the plaintiff a duty of care regarding 
the contractor's actions. 
Id. f 37 (emphasis in original). 
Reinforcing this distinction, the Magana court quoted from Thompson, 1999 UT 
22, T| 13 ("[T]he employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm 
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.") (emphasis by 
Supreme Court), and W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 510 (1984) ("Quite apart from any question of vicarious responsibility, the 
employer may be liable for any negligence of his own in connection with the work to be 
done."). Id. U 37 n. 30-31. 
In this case, Gonzalez does not seek to hold Sorensen liable for the negligence of 
another contractor. To the contrary: Gonzalez seeks to hold Sorensen liable for the 
negligence of Sorensen. The retained control doctrine is thus immaterial to the claim. 
B. The trial court correctly found issues of fact regarding 
Sorensen's breach of duty under Restatement § 384. 
To prevail on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: duty, 
breach, causation, and damages. Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 999 
(Utah 1996). The existence of a duty is generally a question of law, subject to subsidiary 
12 
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issues of fact. AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319-20 
(Utah 1997). 
In its motion for summary judgment, Sorensen essentially argued that it owed no 
duty to Gonzalez because Sorensen did not control the manner or method of Gonzalez's 
work, which would be one source of a duty recognized by the Restatement. In so 
arguing, however, Sorensen's argument overlooked other sources of duty. 
Premises liability is a form of negligence (in other words, one potential source of 
duty). Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, Tj 4, 116 P.3d 263; Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 2002 UT 
App 412, U 8, 61 P.3d 287. In Utah, workers who come to make alterations or repairs are 
business invitees, and are thus owed certain duties while on the premises. Hale, 2005 UT 
24, T| 33. See pp. 27-28, infra (summarizing duties recognized in Hale). 
Claims for breach of such duties are most often brought against the "owner" or 
"possessor" of the premises. In some instances, however, an owner or possessor permits 
(or hires) someone else to take charge of the premises. In this case, owner Orchard Vista 
hired general contractor Sorensen. Sorensen acknowledges - indeed, affirmatively 
declares - that it exercised full control over the entire site, including Building No. 4 
where Gonzalez was working. See p. 8, supra (alleging that Clayton's workers were 
trespassers because they were on the premises without Sorensen's permission). 
When a general contractor exercises control over premises, courts 
"overwhelmingly]" hold that it has the same duties, and the same defenses, as an owner 
or possessor. See Richard L. Ferrell III, EMERGING TRENDS IN PREMISES LIABILITY 
LAW: OHIO'S LATEST MODIFICATION CONTINUES TO CHIP AWAY AT BEDROCK 
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PRINCIPLES, 21 OHION.U. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (1995) (". . . [T]he overwhelming weight 
of authority across the country establishes] that an independent contractor is subject to 
the same liabilities and clothed with the same rights as the landowner" [footnote 
omitted].) Those duties and defenses are, in general, summarized in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 343-343A and surrounding sections. See, e.g., §§ 341 A, 343 (duty 
owed to invitees), § 337 (duty owed to trespassers). 
This principle is summarized in Restatement § 384, titled "Liability of Persons 
Creating Artificial Conditions on Land on Behalf of Possessor for Physical Harm Caused 
While Work Remains in Their Charge," which states: 
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any 
other condition on the land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the 
same freedom from liability, as though he were the possessor of the land, 
for physical harm caused to others upon and outside of the land by the 
dangerous character of the structure or other condition while the work is in 
his charge.4 
Comment g explains when these duties arise and terminate: 
The rule stated in this Section applies to determine the liability of one who 
is entrusted by the possessor of land with the erection of a structure or the 
creation of any other physical condition on the land, for only such bodily 
harm as is caused while he remains in charge and control of the erection or 
creation of the structure or condition. It does not apply to determine his 
liability for harm caused after his charge and control of the work and his 
privilege to be upon the land for the purpose of accomplishing it is 
terminated in any manner. His charge and control is usually terminated by 
the possessor's acceptance of the completed work, but it may be terminated 
in a variety of other ways. For example, the possessor may, in pursuance or 
4
 A similar provision has been proposed in the Tentative Draft of Restatement (Third) of 
Torts'. Phys. & Emot. Harm. Under the proposed draft, which has not yet been cited by 
any courts, application of premises liability duties to contractors is expressed by the 
latter's inclusion in the definition of "possessor." See § 49 (T.D. No. 6, 2009), Possessor 
Of Land Defined, cmts a, e, and f. 
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in violation of his contract, take the work out of the hands of the 
independent contractor before it is completed or may order a servant to stop 
the work entrusted to him. . . . 
As noted above, there is no dispute that Russell Sorensen exercised control over 
the entire premises, including the area in which Gonzalez was injured. The only issue, 
therefore, is whether Utah would join the majority of jurisdictions in adopting § 384. 
Sorensen correctly notes that the Utah Supreme Court has not yet done so. Notably, 
however, the court has applied premises liability duties to general contractors. Kessler v. 
Mortenson, 2000 UT 95, ffif 3, 9-10, 17, 16 P.3d 1225 (reversing orders granting 
summary judgment and allowing attractive nuisance claims against both landowner and 
contractor under Restatement § 339). 
Sorensen argues that, because a contractor generally is not liable for the 
negligence of an independent contractor, it would be inconsistent to allow a claim against 
it under § 384. Sorensen's argument fails in several respects. First, to what negligence 
by another contractor is Sorensen referring? It was Sorensen who allowed the building to 
be constructed too close to the power lines, and who knew that various individuals would 
have to work on the north side of Building No. 4. If Sorensen feels that the 
negligence of Gonzalez or Clayton, or one of its co-defendants, was exclusively the cause 
of the accident, it certainly has not shown so as a matter of law, as required to obtain 
summary judgment. See also Hale, supra (alleged comparative negligence by the worker 
is for the jury, not a bar to suit).5 
5
 Under § 384, a subcontractor may also owe duties if it exercises control over a site. See 
Cmt. d. How the Utah Supreme Court would deal with co- or joint liability under this 
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Sorensen's argument also overlooks the fact that landowners, like contractors, are 
not typically responsible for the negligence of independent contractors, yet premises 
liability remains a separate, viable theory against such owners. (See Brief of Appellant, 
p. 16, citing Hale; see also Price v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc., 2011 UT App 
66, f 26, — P.3d — ("Generally, an employer is not liable to third persons for the torts of 
an independent contractor. . . . 'One exception is that [the] owner of the premises . . . 
[has] a nondelegable duty to keep the premises reasonably safe for business invitees'" 
[citations omitted].). 
Sorensen's argument would thus produce the ironic result that a distant or ignorant 
landowner could be liable to worker-invitees for hazardous conditions on the property, 
but not the general contractor who created the conditions or knowingly permitted them to 
remain. No public purpose would be served by such a result. As the Utah Supreme 
Court observed in Kessler, a contractor is in the best position to assess and remedy 
dangerous conditions on site. 2000 UT 95, f 10 ("Given the rapidly changing nature of a 
residential construction project, the homebuilder is in the best position to recognize 
hazards and to protect children from the danger."). 
Other arguments by Sorensen against the adoption of § 384 appear to 
misapprehend the nature of the duty argued by Gonzalez and recognized by the trial 
court. Accordingly, it seems useful to clarify what that duty does - and does not - entail: 
section is not at issue in the appeal. In any event, Sorensen has taken the position in this 
case that it exercised exclusive control over the site on the day of the accident, alleging 
that it had "closed" the site to "all subcontractors" that day. (R. 656.) 
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1. No duty to supervise method or manner of work performance. 
Gonzalez does not contend that Sorensen has a duty to supervise or exercise 
control over the method or manner by which its subcontractors perform their work, as 
Sorensen suggests. (See Brief of Appellant, pp. 19,29-30.) The Utah Supreme Court has 
already held otherwise. Thompson v. Jess, supra. Gonzalez's injury had nothing to do 
with the method or manner in which soffit is installed - Gonzalez did not injure himself 
by using a nail gun improperly, for example. Rather, the injury arose from a hazardous 
condition on the premises to which anyone working in the area would be exposed. 
The Tenth Circuit (applying Utah law) recognized this basic distinction in Titan 
Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1966). In that case, suit was brought 
against a general contractor and owner for the death of a subcontractor's employee. The 
general contractor challenged the trial court's instruction of the jury as to the duties owed 
by it to the worker under Restatement § 343, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating: 
As applied to a general contractor in control of a structure or premises upon 
which work is being done, the rule is that such contractor is liable to an 
employee of another contractor rightfully using any portion of the premises 
for negligence in failing to keep it in a safe condition and to give warning 
of latent or concealed perils. This rule is not inconsistent nor incompatible 
with the general rule of non-liability of a general contractor for torts of an 
independent contractor. . . . As Judge Warren L. Jones put it, "there is a 
distinction between an unsafe condition incident to or resulting from the 
work to be done and an unsafe condition inhering in the premises where it 
is to be done"' 
365 F.2d at 546 (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Harsch v. City of New York, 
78 AJD.3d 781, 910 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) ("Where, as here, a plaintiffs 
injuries stem not from the manner in which the work was being performed, but, rather, 
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from an alleged dangerous or defective condition on or at the subject premises, a general 
contractor may be liable in common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 if it has 
control over the work site, and either created, or had actual or constructive notice of, the 
dangerous condition.") 
2. No duty to remedy "all known or knowable" dangers. 
Gonzalez does not contend that Sorensen had an automatic duty to remedy "all 
known or knowable" dangers, as Sorensen suggests. {See Brief of Appellant, pp. 17, 29.) 
With respect to invitees, a possessor of land (to which Sorensen's duty analogizes) owes 
only the duties summarized by the Supreme Court in Hale, all of which hinge upon 
reasonableness. See pp. 27-28, infra. It is not strict liability. 
Sorensen's duty to licensees and trespassers would be further limited. See 
Restatement §§ 333-339, 341. In Kessler, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a contention 
that permitting attractive nuisance liability would place "an unnecessary burden on 
homebuilders" and drive up insurance costs and housing prices, noting that a plaintiff 
must still prove his claim, after all: "Homebuilders will not become liable automatically 
for all accidents to children caused by conditions on the site." 2000 UT 95, ffl[ 8, 15. 
Nor would a possessor (contractor) be responsible for transient conditions, or 
conditions of which it could not reasonably have been aware and remedied, as Sorensen 
suggests. (Brief of Appellant, p. 17.) See Price, 2011 UT App 66, f 10 (plaintiff must 
show "(1) the defendant 'had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge 
or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he should 
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have discovered it'; and (2) 'after [obtaining] such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed 
that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied if" (citations omitted)). 
In this case, the power lines did not suddenly gravitate toward Building No. 4 on 
the day of the accident; they had been in place for more than a year, and Sorensen admits 
knowledge of their proximity. Sorensen further admits knowing that the situation could 
have been remedied in various ways, e.g., by calling Rocky Mountain Power or sheathing 
the lines. 
With respect to the proximity, Sorensen's brief asserts a factual argument for 
reversal that was raised for the first time below in its reply memorandum, i.e., that it was 
Orchard Vista, not Sorensen, who was responsible for placement of the building so close 
to the lines. According to Sorensen, all that it did was follow Orchard Vista's plans. 
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 8, 15.) The problem with this argument is twofold. 
First, Gonzalez's experts disagree, indicating that the original plans appear not to 
have been followed. {E.g., R. 910, R. 991.) Second, Sorensen's argument overlooks the 
fact that contractors cannot blindly follow unreasonable plans. As Comment f to § 384 
states: 
The fact that the person erecting the structure or altering the physical condition of 
the land follows exactly the plans, specifications and directions of the possessor, 
does not necessarily prevent him from being liable under the rule stated in this 
Section. A servant or contractor entrusted with such work is usually entitled to 
assume that the plans, specifications and directions given him are such as will 
make the work safe. But they may be so imperfect or improper that the servant or 
6
 "[T]his notice requirement does not apply if the [unsafe] condition or defect was created 
by the defendant himself or his agents or employees." Id. (alteration in original; internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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contractor should, as a reasonable man, realize that the work done thereunder will 
make the structure or condition unsafe. If so, he will be liable even though he 
exactly follows the plans, specifications and directions. 
Utah law is the same. Trujillo v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227, |^§ 39, 
42, 986 P.2d 752 (issue of fact as to whether plans were unreasonably dangerous; 
summary judgment for contractor reversed), and cases cited.7 
3. No duty regarding risks inherent in the work. 
Gonzalez does not contend that Sorensen had a duty with respect to risks that are 
peculiar to, or inherent in, the work performed by subcontractors, as Sorensen suggests. 
{See Brief of Appellant, pp. 20, 25-27.) The Supreme Court has correctly observed that, 
when risks "inhere to the manner in which the work is done," it is more reasonable and 
promotes safety to require the subcontractor to protect itself from such risks. Thompson, 
1999 UT 22, U 31. • 
If Gonzalez had been hired to repair or sleeve the power lines, then proximity to 
the lines would have been inherent to his work. If a worker is hired to do welding, then 
use of a welder inheres to his work. Unreasonably close live power lines are not inherent 
to the installation of soffit (or stucco, or fascia, or to framing, or the other work that 
exposed workers to the wires). 
7
 Sorensen also asserts that "it is undisputed that Gonzalez and his co-workers were the 
only workers present at building four on the date of his accident; consequently, RSC 
could not have directly contributed to Gonzalez's accident." (Brief of Appellant, p. 15.) 
If a defendant digs a hole and then leaves, has not the defendant directly contributed to 
the accident when an invitee falls in the hole? The same is true of a defendant who 
creates and/or ignores a known power line hazard for more than a year, knowing that 
anyone who works in that area will be exposed. 
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After dispelling the various dire scenarios averred by Sorensen, it becomes evident 
that adoption of Restatement § 384 will not shake the foundations of the construction 
industry. It is instead, as the trial court concluded, sound policy. That reality is reflected 
in the fact that all jurisdictions to have considered it have adopted § 384. See Smithey v. 
Stueve Constr. Co., No. 04-4067, 2007 WL 172511, at *4 (D.S.D. Jan. 18, 2007), listing 
o 
jurisdictions and stating that the court is unaware of any jurisdiction rejecting it. 
AM.JUR. 'S summary of the law is the same: 
A person put in control of premises by the owner is under the same 
duty as the owner to keep the premises in safe condition. To similar effect, 
one who does an act or carries on an activity on land on behalf of the 
possessor is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from 
liability, for physical harm caused to others on or outside of the land as 
though he or she were the possessor of the land. In such cases, the decisive 
test of liability is control of the work, and not the actual transfer of 
possession by contract. The duty of care owed by a possessor of premises, 
however, exists only where the possessor, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, knows or should know of such conditions. The duty of a possessor to 
maintain reasonably safe conditions for use by an invitee is nondelegable: a 
contract for its performance by another does not necessarily eliminate an 
owner's responsibility, and does not extend to latent defects or conditions 
that could not have been discovered by reasonable care, whatever conduct 
that standard may require in a particular case. 
8
 While acknowledging (and listing) the string of jurisdictions that have adopted § 384, 
Sorensen argues that "other states have considered and rejected Gonzalez's premises 
liability argument." (Brief of Appellant, p. 23, citing Branum v. Petro-Hunt Corp., No. 
4:09-CV-035, 2010 WL 1977963 (D.N.D. Mar. 15, 2010).) But that case - which does 
not mention § 384 - does not aid Sorensen's position. Branum involved the question of 
"whether plaintiff can hold [a general contractor] vicariously liable for any fault of [a 
subcontractor]," not directly liable for its own breach of duty. Id. (emphasis added.) 
Indeed, Branum concluded its discussion of premises liability by noting that its reasoning 
"applies to any claim for premises liability that goes beyond holding the owner of the 
premises liable for its fault and imposes vicarious liability for the acts of an independent 
contractor." Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
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62 AM.JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 10 (citations omitted). 
In short, 
Independent contractors employed by the owner or occupant of 
premises to perform work thereon are generally held to be invitees to whom 
the owner or occupant owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the 
premises in a safe condition. . . . Such duty has been said to exist not 
because of any contractual relation between the owner and the contractor, 
but because of the general principle that an owner or occupant of premises 
is bound to use ordinary care toward persons who come upon the premises 
for a purpose in which the owner is interested. If the landowner or lessee 
relinquishes possession and control of the premises to an independent 
contractor, the duty of care shifts from the landowner or lessee to the 
independent contractor. 
L. Lehr, 2 PREMISES LIABILITY 3d § 39:7, and authorities cited. 
Moreover, a number of courts (including the Utah Supreme Court in Kessler) have 
recognized the applicability of premises liability to general contractors without explicitly 
citing § 384. See, e.g., Cooper v. Nelson, 211 F.3d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying 
Illinois law); Eischeid v. Dover Constr., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 448, 460 (N.D. Iowa 2003) 
(u[T]he Iowa Court of Appeals has recognized that a more general 'premises liability5 
exception, based on a 'possessor's' control of the land, is also applicable to general 
contractors."). 
Indeed, Sorensen's own memorandum in support of summary judgment attached 
two cases that recognized retained control and premises liability as separate theories of 
liability against a general contractor. See Hillabrand v. Drypers Corp., No. 9-02-37, 
2002 WL 31260045, % 21 (Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 10, 2002) (unpublished) (R. 730), ("The 
duty owed to frequenters, i.e., including employees of other companies, is no more than a 
codification of the common-law duty owed by an owner or occupier of premises to 
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invitees, requiring that the premises be kept in a reasonably safe condition, and that 
warning be given of dangers of which he has knowledge. . . ."); and Rapoza v. Willocks 
Construction Corp., No. 22052, 2004 WL 27460, at *17 (Haw. Jan. 2, 2004) (R. 735) (in 
suit by subcontractor's employee, jury was correctly instructed that general contractor 
Willocks had a "duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work. This duty runs to 
whomever the Defendants require to perform work on the premises," and that "an owner 
or occupier of the property owes a duty of reasonable care to all persons anticipated to be 
on the premises."). 
Sorensen points out that in a number of cases citing § 384, the plaintiffs are 
members of the general public, rather than employees of a subcontractor. That is correct. 
Other cases do involve workers. See, e.g., Konicek v. Loomis Bros., Inc., 457 N.W.2d 
614 (Iowa 1990); Lloyd G. Oliphant & Sons Paint v. Logan, 12 So.3d 614, 618 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2009) ("The general rule is that a general contractor on a construction job who is in 
control of the premises is burdened with the duty to use ordinary care to provide a safe 
place for employees of a subcontractor to work." (citations omitted)); Franklin v. OSCA, 
Inc., 825 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Ark. 1992) ("[Tjhis court explained the duties of a general 
contractor to a subcontractor's employees. The court analogized the duties of a general 
contractor to those of an owner of the premises."). 
Significantly, Sorensen cites no authority adopting the distinction it urges between 
worker-invitees and general public-invitees in a premises liability case. Instead, 
Sorensen relies only upon the Utah Supreme Court's exemption of workers from 
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protection under the "peculiar" and inherent" risk theories of liability in Restatement §§ 
413-414, 416, and 427. See Thompson v. Jess, supra. 
As discussed above, however, the court's interpretation of those sections followed 
naturally from the fact that - by definition - the risks there were inherent in the manner 
of work being clone by the subcontractors. Why should a general contractor have to 
protect a subcontractor from a risk that is part and parcel of the very job for which the 
subcontractor was hired? 
The same cannot be said for a hazardous condition on the premises. It was not 
inherent in the job for Gonzalez to encounter an unreasonably close power line on the site 
any more than it would have been inherent for him to encounter a pit of spikes. 
Moreover, all subcontractors working in the area were exposed to the condition. 
As a final contention, Sorensen argues that the court should consider the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 27-28 (citing "incentive inherent 
in the [Act] for injured workers and the workers compensation carrier to shift liability to 
other parties").) Sorensen expresses dismay that, under § 384, a worker or compensation 
carrier could shift the loss for an injury to a general contractor. 
That is true - because that is what the legislature has dictated. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized that the Workers' Compensation Act is a compromise, part of 
which is the express right of employees and carriers to assert claims against negligent 
third parties. Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, \ 28, 232 P.3d 1059. 
Sorensen's concern about unfair shifting of burdens might have merit if the 
alleged duty involved liability for a risk inherent in the work, which risk should be 
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allocated to the subcontractor/worker himself. In such circumstance, it would indeed be 
anomalous for the worker or his carrier to recover from a third party. See Thompson, 
1999 UT 22, |^ 31. The opposite is true, however, when the risk is not inherent in the 
subcontractor's work - in that case, it is unfair for the worker or his carrier to bear the 
burden, rather than the negligent party. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND ISSUES OF FACT ON 
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS. 
Sorensen's brief does not appear to challenge the trial court's denial of summary 
judgment if, as a general contractor in charge of the premises, it owed duties to Gonzalez. 
Ample evidence supports the trial court's determination that issues of fact exist. 
A. Fact issues exist as to whether Sorensen created the dangerous 
condition. 
As noted, Sorensen built Building No. 4, which was too close to the power lines. 
Although Sorensen seeks to point fingers at Orchard Vista, even if Sorensen followed 
Orchard Vista's specifications, a jury could easily find the erection of a building too close 
to live power lines on its face unreasonable. (See pp. 19-20, supra.) 
B. Fact issues exist as to whether Sorensen took reasonable steps to 
protect invitees from the dangerous condition once it existed. 
Because a general contractor's liability under § 384 is co-extensive with that of the 
owner or possessor of land, the next step is to analyze Sorensen's (in)actions as if 
Sorensen were the owner or possessor. In this regard, it is instructive to explore Hale in 
some detail. The facts there, as described by the Supreme Court, were as follows: 
Beckstead, acting as his own general contractor, hired Hale to paint the 
interior of his semiconstructed home in Santa Clara, Utah in 1996. 
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Beckstead purchased the paint supplies and indicated generally how he 
wanted the paint to look, but otherwise exercised no control over the 
manner in which Hale was to accomplish the job for which he was hired. 
Because the house was still under construction, a railing had not been 
installed on the second floor balcony. While painting one day, Hale was 
injured when he accidentally stepped off the second floor balcony and 
fell to the floor below. 
Hale, 2005 UT24, %3. 
Hale filed suit against the owner/general contractor. The district court granted 
summary judgment against him, reasoning that the owner owed no duty toward the 
painter because the allegedly dangerous condition (lack of a railing) was open and 
obvious. The case next went to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. 
This Court began its analysis by rejecting the defendant's argument (and 
Sorensen's here) that the plaintiffs claim should be analyzed under retained control 
principles, noting that the retained control doctrine has nothing to do with liability as a 
possessor of land: 
Beckstead asks us to decide this appeal by applying the rules of liability 
for employers of independent contractors as outlined in the Restatement 
section 409, its companion sections, and the case of Thompson v. Jess, 
1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322, which applies various sections of chapter 15 
of the Restatement, including section 409. See id. at 13. Beckstead's 
reliance on these authorities is misplaced. Thompson dealt with issues 
of the "retained control" doctrine and the "peculiar risk" and "inherently 
dangerous work" doctrines under the Restatement sections 413, 426, and 
427, Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at 11 (quotations omitted), issues not 
relevant to this appeal. More importantly, Thompson contains no 
analysis with regard to the duty owed by a possessor of land to an 
invitee. See id. And while section 409 has some applicability with 
regard to the relationship between Beckstead and Hale (where Beckstead 
did not participate in or control the manner in which Hale performed the 
painting, such that Beckstead owed Hale no duty of care concerning the 
safety of the manner or method of performance Hale chose to 
implement), this analysis is not dispositive. As we discuss in detail 
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below, Hale was a business visitor, an invitee on Beckstead's land—a 
status wholly separate from any status he may have had as an 
independent contractor, which no one disputes. 
Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, U 11 n.2, 74 P.3d 628. 
Analyzing Hale's negligence claim under §§ 343 and 343A, this Court concluded 
that the claim was barred because the hazard (lack of a railing) was open and obvious, 
and the owner/general contractor "could reasonably expect that Hale 'would take the 
necessary safety precautions'" and "had no reason to anticipate that Hale would proceed 
to encounter the unprotected balcony without taking the necessary safety precautions." 
Id., \ 20 (brackets omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the latter ruling. The court first agreed that an 
owner/general contractor's duty to subcontractors' employees is defined in Restatement 
§§ 343 and 343A. Hale, 2005 UT 24, ^ 7. Under those sections, a defendant may be 
liable for failing to make a worksite reasonably safe even if a dangerous condition is open 
and obvious. The court noted: "The Restatement does not so strictly define a 
landowner's duty as to eliminate any duty to protect or warn his invitees of obvious 
dangers." Id. at H 25. 
The Supreme Court described a number of circumstances in which a duty exists in 
the presence of an "open and obvious" danger on the possessor's property. For example: 
•' First, "if a landowner 'should expect that [an invitee] will . . . fail to protect 
[himself] against [a dangerous condition],' the landowner must exercise 
reasonable care to protect him." Id. (quoting § 343(b), (c)). 
• Second, "a landowner has a duty to protect his invitees from obviously 
harmful conditions or activities on the property if the landowner 'should 
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anticipate the harm' despite the obvious nature of the danger." Id. (quoting 
§343A(1)). 
• Third, a possessor may be liable for a failure to warn or to take other 
reasonable steps to protect the invitee "[w]here an 'invitee's attention may 
be distracted, such that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget 
what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.'" Id. at \ 26 
(quoting § 343A cmt. 1(f)). 
Fourth, a possessor may be liable if it "has reason to believe that 'the 
invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a 
reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh 
the apparent risk.'" Id. (quoting § 343A cmt. 1(f)). 
Applying these standards to the facts of this case, the trial court correctly found 
issues of fact regarding the reasonableness of Sorensen's conduct. A jury could 
obviously conclude that Sorensen had reason to "anticipate the harm": Sorensen had 
built the structure too close to the power lines, knew that workers would be exposed to 
them, and took no steps to correct or protect against the dangerous condition. The trial 
court correctly denied summary judgment. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
CONCLUDING THAT SORENSEN HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF 
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS. 
In a secondary argument, Sorensen faults the trial court for concluding that 
Sorensen was sufficiently on notice of Gonzalez's negligence claim. According to 
Sorensen, it did not realize until Gonzalez "recharacterized" his claim in response to the 
motion for summary judgment that Gonzalez might argue premises liability. (Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 30-34.)9 
9
 Although not part of its argument for reversal, Sorensen's brief alleges that, after oral 
argument, Gonzalez'scounsel "attempt[ed]" to submit "additional argument" "ex parte 
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Sorensen's claim of surprise is rather perplexing, because it was Sorensen's 
motion, not Gonzalez's response, that sought to add a cause of action to Gonzalez's 
amended complaint that did not exist. Gonzalez's amended complaint did not state a 
cause of action for vicarious liability, nor retained control. 
In other words, Sorensen accuses Gonzalez of abandoning a claim that was not 
there in the first place. The amended complaint asserted two causes of action: 
negligence and hazardous activity. The first paragraph of the negligence claim plainly 
stated that it was based upon exposure to a hazardous condition on the property, alleging, 
inter alia, that Sorensen: 
a. Fail[ed] to properly exercise and maintain a place of 
employment, which was free from recognized hazards that were likely to 
cause death or serious physical harm to individuals working on the 
Property) 
* * * 
and without leave of Court." (Brief of Appellant, p. 9.) Sorensen refers to two trial court 
rulings to which Gonzalez'scounsel referred during argument in response to Sorensen's 
characterization of Gonzalez'sargument as "novel." {See Exh. 2, pp. 15-16.) Sorensen 
says that "neither the trial court nor counsel for RSC accepted the copies offered by 
Plaintiffs counsel." (Brief of Appellant, p. 9.) No citation is offered for that statement, 
which is incorrect. With a 15-minute time limit (R. 1165, Exh. 2, p. 3), the undersigned 
expressed willingness to provide copies of the referenced rulings, but did not ask to 
approach the bench nor address counsel at that time. (Exh. 2, pp. 15-16.) Afterward, the 
copies were provided as promised, with a cover letter stating only, "During the oral 
argument in the above-captioned case, I made reference to the ruling in the following 
cases [two cases identified]. For your convenience, I have enclosed copies of the 
opinions in these cases. I have also provided counsel for defendant Sorensen with the 
Memorandum Decisions." (Brief of Appellant, Exh. B.) It is hard to see how this was 
either "additional argument" or "ex parte," but in any event, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in implicitly rejecting Sorensen's motion to strike the letter, characterizing 
the decisions as informative. (R. 1585; see Rulings attached as Add. Exh. 3.) 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c. Fail[ed] to ensure that the development of the Property did 
not encroach upon the electrical lines lining the Property, or that proper 
safety measures regarding power lines were followed, including cutting off 
power to the electrical lines, insulating the electrical lines and protecting 
the 10 foot safety c i r c l e ; . . . . 
* * * 
h. Allow[ed] individuals to work on the unsafe scaffolding and 
within 10 feet of the power lines when they knew or should have known it 
was unsafe to do so. 
Would Sorensen have claimed surprise if the complaint referred to hazards on the 
"premises"? It is doubtful, yet "property" and "premises" are essentially synonymous. 
See, e.g., Roget's Desk Thesaurus 415 (1996) (synonyms for premises include "buildings 
and grounds, property, site"); We bster 's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the 
English Language 1526 (1996) (defining "premises" as "c. the property forming the 
subject of a conveyance or bequest"). Utah law has never adopted a "magic word" 
requirement for pleadings. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 
1366, 1374 (Utah 1996). 
If uncertainty existed, Sorensen had recourse. For example, it could have filed a 
motion for a more definite statement. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 
1218, 1222 n.3 (Utah 1996). It could have submitted "contention" interrogatories. Two 
years of discovery and motions provided ample opportunity to flesh out the parties' 
positions. For example, Sorensen's principal Russell Sorensen was expressly questioned 
during his deposition regarding the creation, location, and knowledge of the hazardous 
condition. {E.g., R. 923, 945-950, 952-953, 1348-1349, 2067-2072.) 
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Other indicia suggest that Sorensen was not, or should not have been, surprised by 
Gonzalez's citation to premises liability: 
Sorensen's answer set forth a premises liability defense. (R. 168, Tenth Defense: 
("Discovery may reveal Plaintiffs damages were the result of an open and obvious risk 
of which Plaintiff was or should have been aware and, accordingly, Plaintiffs claims are 
barred.5').) 
Sorensen's expert designation, filed a year before its motion, recognized 
Gonzalez's claim as involving the presence of a hazardous condition. (R. 610 ("Since 
Mr. Sorensen had not given permission, to John Clayton Construction, for work on the 
north side of unit 12 he couldn't have anticipated that John Clayton Construction was 
going to be exposed to the hazard of the power line and scaffold."), and asserting that 
UOSH "had the best information with regards to the actual site conditions'" (Emphases 
added).) 
Sorensen's own motion for summary judgment cited cases brought by worker-
plaintiffs that expressly recognized premises liability as an independent basis of liability 
against general contractors. See pp. 22-23, supra. 
In light of the wording of the complaint and the accompanying circumstances, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Sorensen was (or should have 
been) on notice of a claim based upon a hazardous condition on the property, i.e., a 
premises liability claim. Rule 8 requires only a "short and plain" statement of the claim. 
Although Gonzalez correctly identified his claim as sounding in negligence, a party is not 
even required to plead legal theories. Casaday v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2010 UT App 
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82, H 12, 232 P.3d 1075; Baicker-McKee, et al., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK § 
8(a), p. 285 (Thomson/West: 2008) (legal theories need not be pled under F.R.Civ.P. 
8(a)); see also Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("In 
characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the 
pleading labels chosen."). 
Sorensen cites various cases in which trial courts felt differently, ruling that a 
party was not on notice of a claim. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 30-31.) Notably, however, 
the offending parties in those cases there were attempting to change their factual 
predicates. That cannot be claimed here - this case has been all about the power lines 
from day one. 
"The fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute while leaving issue-formulation to the discovery process. These principles are 
applied with great liberality in sustaining the sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of 
action." Casaday, 2010 UT App 82, \ 11 {quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 
P.2d 966, 971 (court's brackets and ellipses omitted)); see also Mack v. Utah State Dep't. 
of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, f 17, 221 P.3d 194 (Rule 8 is to be liberally construed in 
favor of the plaintiff).10 
10
 Even on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the trial court must "accept any reasonable 
interpretation of plaintiff s claims." Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (reversing trial court's dismissal of complaint on grounds that vicarious liability 
claim was not cognizable, because complaint could "reasonably be interpreted to be a 
claim of direct personal responsibility" on the part of the defendant). 
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In this case, Sorensen failed to recognize the possibility that a claim based on 
"hazards . . . on the Property" might constitute a premises liability claim. To explain its 
misapprehension, Sorensen says that Gonzalez should have affirmatively alleged that 
Sorensen was an "owner" or "possessor" of land. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 2, 32-33.) But 
such an allegation would have been incorrect. 
As stated in § 384 and the other authorities cited above, the general contractor's 
duty is "the same as" or "analogous to" that of an owner or possessor - but the general 
contractor does not thereby become an owner or possessor. Gonzalez's identification of 
Sorensen as the general contractor was correct. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Gonzalez respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's denial of Russell Sorensen Construction's motion for 
summary judgment. 
DATED this 27th day of May, 2011. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
William J. Hansen 
Karra J. Porter 
Tyler V. Snow 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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JUL-30-2010 FRI 04:28 PN 3RD DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. 8012387542 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT?, .STATE OP UTAH 
mnnnsTHrerauR? 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 3 0 2010 
S A L T t ^ s M ^ 
Deputy Olsrk 
JOSE M. GONZALEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ORCHARD iVISTA, LLC, PACIFICORP,-
an Oregon corporation d/b/a •• 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER, R-M. REES 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah . 
corporation d/b/a/ DESIGN STONE 
CREATIONS, RUSSELL SOREN5EN 
CONSTRUCTION, a sole 
proprietorship, JOHN DOE 
ENTITIES.1-5 and.JOHN DOES 1-5, 
'.Defendants. 
Bya 
• . MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 080921130 
Hon. JOSEPH C.FRATTO, JR. 
PACIFICORP, | 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs.; '; • • .' 
JOHN CLAYTON CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., ; 
' i . 
Third-Party Defendant. 
•i . - • 
M i i ' " ' u p * ..•• . •••....«., 
?he ;above~entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Russell Spreneen Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment, The 
Court he^rd oral argument with respect to the Motion on July 21, 
2010', Following the hearing,, the motion was taken ^n^^: 
.advisement, . • ..v 
The. Court having considered the motion,, memoranda, exhibits." 
6 reached- thereto and for the good ,cau3e shown/ hereby enters the 
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rov-cviu rtu ww m W U1SIK1UT COURT FAX NO. .8012387542 P. 03 
• ' , ' . • • j '• • . ' . ' 
* • • . - . ' • . ' • . . • • • ' • . ' . ' i 
• " - ' *" ; • . I ' ' • . 
I • j ; 
• • • • ' - • ! 
: GONZAL3Z v. ORCHARD VISTA ST' At,- I MEMORANDUM DSCISION 
• . - . ' '.'!*•'. i ! 
: ; • . ' " . - " • i , • I' . , 
1 . 
I 
, following ruling, ; L " ' • ; -.-. 
In support, of its motion Russell Sorensen Construction . • • 
("RSC") argues Utah lav/ is clear that 33 tj^e.. general contractor 
on- the project, RSC cannot pe liable for the workplace,Injury of 
> a John Clayton Construction' (nJCCn) employee unless RSC exercised 
affirmative control over the.injury causing aspect of the work, 
•Moreover/ asserts RSC, plaintiff*sattempts! to recast its claims 
against RSC as direct, negligence claims fa til as it is undisputed 
. that RSC ;did not directly participate in.JCC's performance in the 
injury causing aspect of the.work and plaintiff's attempts to 
impose landowner1 liability fails a? plaintiiff failed to .plead or 
give notice of-this claim until the opposing memoranda. Further, 
• contends 'RSC,: because Orchard Vistc}, .LLC, another defendant in 
this case!, . owned and possessed the ;propertyf-and there is no 
evidence. RSC owned or possessed the property-plaintiff:»s claim of 
premises CLialDiliry must fail, Finally, argues RSC, Utah has not 
. adopted Restatement § 334 and. would not adopt it in this case as 
• . - • ' • ' "
:
" " ' i • 
it is in direct contravention of Utah's general rule of 
non-liability. ; 
• ' i 
• In opposition, plaintiff asserts he isjbringing a claim of 
direct negligence, not vicarious liability,.;and based upon the 
Utah Supreme Court!s decision in Hale v. Beokst&ad 2005 UT 24, 
' . ' - - • • « 
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GONZALEZ v, ORCHARD VJ3TA Sfl AL. '. ' MEMORANDUM DECISION -
I .'33, ll§ P.3d. 263' (which applied premises liability negligence 
principles to claims by Subcontractors)', $ general contractor who 
assumes-control of a site is a possessor of land and a 
. .subcontractor's employee is'a business invitee. According to 
plaintiffr under'the Restatement, a possessor owes business 
invitees an affirmative duty not to create a dangerous condition 
' • - . ' ' • . . - . * * 
on the premises and owes a. further duty to take .reasonable-steps 
to make the premises- 3afe, 
In the present case, argues plaintiff; RSC created a 
dangerous and unsafe condition by constructing building No, 4, 
which contained Units 12 & 13, -in violation of the National 
Electrical Safety Code, which requires minimum vertical and 
horizontal clearances to the high voltage power lines, The 
problem was further compounded, asserts plaintiff, by the fact 
that RSC .failed to take reasonable steps to make the premises 
safe for subcontractors. . • '. •;. 
. After reviewing the record in this matter, including 
consideration-of plaintiff's claim of ''possessor liability,1' 
which in light of Utah's liberal pleading standards, is 
appropriate, the Court is not persuaded summary judgment can be 
. granted in the instant. Indeed, while no Utah Court has 
. explicitly adopted this section of the'Restatement (Second) of • 
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GONSA£S5-'v..'ORCHARP VISTA E? A&. •. MSWORANDUM DECISION 
Torts, such a theory of liability has not been' rejected by the 
Courts in Utah and indeed/ it haa been continuously adopted in 
other jurisdictions. Moreover, although not binding precedent, 
district courts in Utah have also been persuaded of.its 
applicability. 
. Applied 10 the f^cts of this case, the Court finds it 
sensible to conclude that when an owner relinquishes control of 
property to a general contractor, that contractor must, be-
responsible for any conditions it.creates on the property, 
specifically, in this matter, the constructing of a.building and 
its resulting conditions. In sum, the Court agrees with 
Plaintiff and-concludes that § 384.reflects sound policy and j 
should be applied in the instant-.- • 
.This: said, disputed Issues of material fact with respect to 
whether ,RSC created a dangerous condition on the premises and . 
further,-.whether RSC took reasonable steps to protect invitees, 
precludes- summary judgment. Russell Sorenaen Construction's 
Motion for Summary 
'DATED this 3 
Judgment is, regpectf 
) day of July, 2010 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE M. GONZALEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
5 STAR INVESTMENTS, et al, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 080921130 PI 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
July 21, 2010 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
Third District Court Judge 
Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT 
152 Katresha St. 
Grantsville, UT 84029 
Telephone: (435) 884-5515 
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Mark Taylor 
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Rick Rose 
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36 S. State St. #1400 
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James Black 
Matthew Black 
265 E. 100 S. #255 
SLC, UT 84111 
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Joseph Barrett 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I (Electronically recorded on August 20, 2010) 
3 THE COURT: We are gathered here in the matter of Jose 
4 M. Gonzalez vs. Orchard Vista and others, specifically Russell 
5 Sorensen Construction, and they are the defendants. Then we have 
6 I Pacific Corp Corporation -- Pacific Corp, a third party plaintiff 
7 I vs. John Clayton Construction, the defendant. 
8 What I have in front of me here and noticed for hearing 
9 I is Russell Sorensen Construction's motion for summary judgment. 
10 We've allotted a half an hour. I did observe that from James R. 
11 Black a letter that -- and some courtesy copies of responses to 
12 I this motion I believe were included in this, together with a 
13 I request, if you will, of their other motions, that it might make 
14 some sense that we entertain those motions during the course of 
15 these proceedings. 
16 I Normally what I would have if Counsel were agreed 
17 I to have these matters considered during the course of these 
18 I proceedings and hear argument I would do that, but it seems to 
19 me our time is limited, and I want the benefit -- quite frankly, 
20 I it's a good argument here regarding the motion that's in front of 
21 I me. So the request is denied. 
22 Let's have your appearances and the argument on Russell 
23 Sorensen Construction's motion for summary judgment. 
24 MS. PORTER: Karra Porter, Heidi Goelbel and William 
2 5 I Hansen for the Gonzalez plaintiffs. 
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1 THE COURT: For the plaintiffs. 
2 MR. CURTIS: Timothy Curtis and Mark Taylor for Russell 
3 Sorensen Construction. 
4 MR. ROSE: Your Honor, Rick Rose for Pacific Corp. 
5 MR. BLACK: James Black and Matthew Black for John 
6 Clayton Construction. 
7 MR. BARRETT: Joseph Barrett from Snow, Christensen 
8 and Martineau along with Tony Johnson on behalf of RM Rees 
9 Construction. 
10 THE COURT: Who was anticipated to be arguing today? 
11 MR. CURTIS: Your Honor, I'll be arguing on behalf of 
12 Russell Sorensen Construction. 
13 MS-. PORTER: And I'll be arguing on behalf of Gonzalez. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Curtis, your motion. 
15 MR. CURTIS: Good morning, your Honor. As I stated 
16 earlier, I represent Russell Sorensen Construction. Russell 
17 Sorensen Construction was a general contractor on a residential 
18 I construction project in Midvale, Utah. The project consisted 
19 I of 13 separate housing units that were housed in four total 
2 0 I buildings. The plaintiff was employed by John Clayton 
21 Construction. 
22 John Clayton Construction was a subcontractor of 
23 Sorensen Construction, and John Clayton Construction was hired 
24 I to install soffit, fascia and siding on the buildings in the 
25 project. An additional subcontractor, RM Rees was hired by 
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Sorensen Construction to perform stucco work on the project. 
On June 22nd the plaintiff and two of his co-workers 
had arrived at the project to perform soffit and fascia work on 
the fourth and final building of the project. The plaintiff and 
his co-workers were the only workers present at that building on 
the date of the accident, but while working on the project the 
plaintiff was attempting to install a 12-foot piece of aluminum J 
channel that came in contact with high voltage overhead power 
line and was injured during that contact. 
Utah has a long established general rule that the 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the 
physical harm caused by another -- by an act or omission of 
a contractor or its servants. For ease and reference we've 
referred to this as Utah's general rule of non-liability so 
we don't have to continue to repeat the long phrase. 
The one exception to the general rule of non-liability 
is the retained control doctrine. Our motion for summary 
judgment is straightforward. Utah law is clear that Sorensen 
Construction as the general contractor on the project cannot be 
liable for the workplace injury of John Clayton's employee unless 
Russell Sorensen Construction exercised affirmative control over 
the injury causing aspect of the work. Now --
THE COURT: Wouldn't it -- I don't mean to interrupt you 
here, but that sort of -- that's sort of a rubber hits the road 
on this one. 
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1 MR. CURTIS: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Isn't that a factual question whether they 
3 I have exercised that kind of control that would make them liable? 
4 MR. CURTIS: Absolutely. I think that's a factual 
5 question, and it's a factual question that's been undisputed by 
6 the parties. 
7 THE COURT: Well, that was my next question. What --
8 where does that stand here in terms of a material fact not 
9 reasonably in dispute? 
10 MR. CURTIS: I believe --
11 THE COURT: That (inaudible) the question. 
12 MR. CURTIS: Absolutely. I believe we've set forth 
13 facts in our motion for summary judgment that are not in dispute 
14 by either the plaintiff or by John Clayton Construction. Russell 
15 Sorensen Construction apart from scheduling and sequencing the 
16 work on the project, he wasn't swinging hammers or pounding nails 
17 on the project. He scheduled and sequenced the work. 
18 John Clayton Construction, it's undisputed in the 
19 I test -- in the deposition of John Clayton and its workers that 
2 0 Russell Sorensen Construction didn't instruct them on how to do 
21 their work, what safety measures to undertake, what materials 
2 2 they were going to use, what method or manner in which they were 
23 going to perform their work, and it's undisputed that John 
24 I Clayton Construction had complete autonomy over how they 
2 5 performed their work on this project. I don't believe that fact 
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1 has been disputed by anybody in this process. 
2 John Clayton and its employees determined the lengths 
3 of materials that they would use and that they would install on 
4 the project. They determined when, where and how to perform 
5 their work. They -- when they arrived at the project there was 
6 I some scaffolding that was installed by another subcontractor, 
7 Mr. Rees. The employees for John Clayton Construction decided 
8 without consulting with either Russell Sorensen Construction or 
9 I RM Rees to utilize the scaffolding. 
10 At no time on this project did Russell Sorensen exercise 
11 operative control over the mode or manner in which John Clayton 
12 Construction performed its work. In Utah merely possessing 
13 supervisory control over an -independent contractor is not 
14 sufficient to trigger the retained control doctrine. That's --
15 THE COURT: Well, as -- what does the record show here 
16 I in terms of as the general contractor what they actually did in 
17 relation to Sorensen. What did they do? 
18 MR. CURTIS: What Sorensen did in relation to --
19 THE COURT: Well, I know what they didn't do. 
20 MR. CURTIS: -- John Clayton Construction? 
21 THE COURT: I understand your position in terms — 
22 MR. CURTIS: Sure. 
23 THE COURT: -- of what they didn't do, but what did they 
24 do? 
25 MR. CURTIS: They would schedule and sequence the work. 
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They would let the subcontractors know when the project was ready 
for them to come and perform their work, but they left how the 
work was to be performed up to the individual subcontractors. 
The subcontractors come out, put a bid on the project, and it was 
left, up to them -- you know, Russell Sorensen may have said, you 
know, we'd like brown soffit and fascia, may have controlled like 
the color of the fascia or the soffit or the siding, but as far 
as how John Clayton Construction performed its work on the 
project, those are things that were left in the complete and 
total discretion of John Clayton Construction. 
THE COURT: So is it a -- just so I understand your 
position, as the record shows --- the record in front of me shows 
that other than scheduling the work to be done, and apparently 
making some decisions regarding color of soffit and fascia, 
gutters, that was the extent? 
MR. CURTIS: That was the extent, yes, your Honor. 
Indeed the only issue pertinent to whether Russell Sorensen 
Construction is liable for the plaintiff's actions is whether 
they affirmatively controlled the method or operative detail or 
the work. 
Now in order to counter our motion for summary judgment, 
the plaintiff has raised for the first time a premises liability 
argument. Now this is an argument that was never presented in 
their original pleadings. It was presented for the first time in 
their opposition to summary judgment. The reason why they've 
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1 kind of taken this tact is because there is a case that was 
2 released back in I believe 2009. It was the Magana case that 
3 both sides have argued or used in their favor. 
4 I Now we believe that the facts and holding of the Magana 
5 demonstrate the Russell Sorensen Construction is entitled to 
6 summary judgment. We also argue that the plaintiff can't for the 
7 first time in an opposition raise new and novel theories in order 
8 to try to defeat the summary judgment motion. 
9 Most importantly, the argument that plaintiff is making 
10 is premised upon a legal theory that -- they argue the adoption 
11 of a restatement section that has not been adopted by Utah 
12 I Courts, which would be inconsistent with Utah's general rule of 
13 I non-liability. If the Court were to accept plaintiff's argument 
14 it would severely undermine all of the retained control precedent 
15 that came before it. 
16 Now in Magana -- so this is a case that both sides have 
17 argued -- argues in their favor. The Court in Magana pointed out 
18 that the general rule of non-liability recognizes that one who 
19 hires an independent contractor and does not participate or 
20 control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed 
21 I owes no duty of care concerning the safety or manner or method of 
22 the performance implemented. 
23 Now the Utah Supreme Court in Magana upheld the trial 
24 court and the Court of Appeals' determination that all of 
25 Magana's claims -- all of the plaintiff's claims were properly 
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1 I dismissed by the trial court, and that decision was properly 
2 upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals except for one, and that 
3 I claim was a direct negligence claim that was premised upon the 
4 allegation that the defendant's supervisor personally assisted 
5 and personally rid a load of trusses that fell onto the plaintiff 
6 I in Magana. None of the remaining claims for failing to properly 
7 (maintain a safe construction site, failure to disclose and warn 
8 of known dangers, the failure to correct known hazards, the 
9 I failure to implement and follow safe work policies and procedures 
10 were considered by the Utah Supreme Court to constitute direct 
11 negligence . 
12 Now the Utah Supreme Court clearly demonstrated what it 
13 considered the direct negligence of the defendant when it said, 
14 "By asserting that Campbell himself negligently rigged the truss 
15 joints, Magana's negligence claim exceeds the scope of the 
16 retained control doctrine because his assertion relates to 
17 I Campbell's acts and not to Circle T's acts." 
18 Now unlike the Magana case, in the instant case Russell 
19 Sorensen Construction didn't participate or assist in the 
20 I performance of John Clayton or the plaintiff's work. It's 
21 undisputed that the plaintiff and his two co-workers were the 
22 I only workers present at the job site on the day of the accident. 
23 They were the only (inaudible) present on that building on the 
24 date of the accident. So there's nobody other than John Clayton 
25 employees that the plaintiff can claim directly participated 
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alongside them in the performance of their work. 
Now while the plaintiff asserts that its claims were 
based on premises liability, we've argued -- we've pointed out 
four cases where the Utah appellate courts have said you can't 
raise new and novel theories, you can't attempt to amend your 
complaint in an opposition for a motion for summary judgment. 
Now in each of those cases a plaintiff's failure to 
properly plead their new and novel theory resulted in the Court 
disregarding the arguments and the dismissal of the unpled 
claims. The plaintiff's amended complaint, they filed their 
complaint, I believe, in '07, amended it within three or four 
months after filing it. 
Now the plaintiff's amended complaint never alleges that 
Russell Sorensen owned or possessed the property. In fact, the 
plaintiff's complaint alleges that Orchard Vista, a co-defendant 
in this case, owned and possessed the property. Throughout the 
entire discovery process plaintiff has been building its claim 
for premises liability against Orchard Vista and has directed 
its claims against Russell Sorensen Construction in another 
direction. It's only now at this point that they're attempting 
to change their claims and say that Russell Sorensen Construction 
now owes the duty of a land owner. 
THE COURT: Mr. Curtis, may I ask this? In terms of 
what the state of the record is, I understand your argument 
regarding raising this issue regarding the premises liability, 
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1 but the state of the record in terms of the material facts to 
2 that claim would be what? That is what -- let me ask that as a 
3 I question. 
4 MR. CURTIS: Sure. 
5 THE COURT: What are the material facts that --
6 MR. CURTIS: I think that's an interesting point that 
7 you've seized on. If you were to look at the plaintiff's 
8 opposition to our motion for summary judgment, there's not a 
9 material fact that's alleged that says Russell Sorensen owned the 
10 property or that Russell Sorensen controlled the property. The 
11 argument is made in the body. There's no material fact that's 
12 been alleged, I believe, in the plaintiff's statement of material 
13 facts . 
14 I So there's no real evidence before the Court other than 
15 the plaintiff's allegation that Russell Sorensen was a general 
16 contractor. If you apply the Restatement 384, Restatement 384 
17 says that an owner can delegate its responsibilities to the 
18 general contractor, and their argument is he's a general 
19 contractor. Restatement 384 says he can have the same 
20 liabilities as a landowner. 
21 j They neglect to point out that Restatement 384 also says 
22 that the general contractor can then delegate those same duties 
23 to the subcontractors, but there's been no material allegation. 
24 There's been no allegation of material fact made by the plaintiff 
25 to properly establish that Russell Sorensen should be liable 
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under a premises liability theory apart from the legal argument 
that was contained in the body of their opposition. 
THE COURT: So would it be -- well, is the record in 
front of me in terms of what are the undisputed material facts, 
or the disputed material facts for that matter regarding premises 
liability, there is no record -- I mean there is no record in 
front of me, actual record in front of me? 
MR. CURTIS: I think the only record that was presented 
was things that we've pointed out in our reply memorandum where 
we've demonstrated that the plaintiff's experts raised premises 
liability arguments against Orchard Vista and not Russell 
Sorensen Construction. So apart from that, I'm not sure of any 
allegations of material fact raised by either Russell Sorensen- or 
the plaintiff that would establish premises liability type claim 
against Russell Sorensen Construction. 
Now the way they get --
THE COURT: It appears to me, I suppose, your time is 
up. 
MR. CURTIS: Can I just stress one case briefly, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: I'll give you 30 seconds. 
MR. CURTIS: Okay. The one case that they use to 
allege this premises liability case I believe is completely 
distinguishable. The Hale vs. Beckstead case that they use, and 
they say it's a Hale claim, the general contractor in Hale was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-14-
1 also the owner of the property. I think that's a distinguishing 
2 factor in this case. The plaintiff in Hale alleged premises 
3 liability initially in their complaint against the defendant. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. 
5 MR. CURTIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Ms. Porter? 
7 MS. PORTER: Thank you, your Honor. I think it's 
8 obvious from both the argument today and the opposing memo 
9 I that Russell Sorensen doesn't really dispute our analysis of 
10 applicable premises liability law, hence the fact that they spent 
11 I 88 percent of their opposing memo trying to claim that they 
12 weren't on notice of it and that's why they didn't raise it. 
13 Let me do a couple of things, if I may. One, I want to 
14 briefly address the assertion that we did not present any factual 
15 record with respect to a premises liability claim. Then I will 
16 I go ahead and address what is really their main if not only 
17 I argument which is that we didn't use the right magic words in 
18 our complaint. 
19 With respect to the merits of the argument, I think 
2 0 Counsel forgot the key case. It wasn't really Magana. Magana, 
21 in our view, just stated the obviously, vicarious liability, 
22 direct liability. The two are totally different. That's what 
23 Magana said, and that -- we always thought was fairly obvious. 
24 I What Counsel left out was the fact that the case law on 
25 this has been established since 2005. It's been almost five 
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1 years that general contractors have been on notice that premises 
2 liability claims are viable. There's a big difference between 
3 what they call this general rule of non-1iabi1ity. What it 
4 I should really be called is general rule of non-vicarious 
5 I liability, because that's what Magana said. They said, "You 
6 can't just assume that every claim by a subcontractor's employee 
7 must be based on vicarious liability and therefore must have to 
8 I show retained control element." Frankly, I don't know any 
9 respectable plaintiff's attorney since 2005 that would still be 
10 I arguing retained control when you've got the beauty of Hale vs. 
11 Beckstead. 
12 I Then we hear, "Well, this is a novel" -- by the way, 
13 we hear for the first time in the reply memorandum that this is 
14 a novel theory, this is a desperate theory. I believe it's an 
15 I established principle of law, your Honor, that the more often a 
16 I party calls the other party desperate the more trouble they know 
17 they're in. 
18 When I reread that last night, I thought, you know what, 
19 this right here -- Judge Hansen from March of this year agreeing 
20 J with our desperate and novel theory that 384 is a cognizable 
21 cause of action against all contractors in Utah, subcontractors, 
22 I employee, same type of pleadings that we've asserted here. 
23 I Here's Judge Lindberg from May 26th, so two months ago 
24 agreeing with our desperate and novel theory as to Section 384. 
25 I There is not a Court anywhere in the country, and you notice they 
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1 couldn't find one either, that has said, "No, we reject Section 
2 3 8 4." 
3 I brought copies of these -- they're memorandum 
4 I decisions, but technically they have no precedential support. We 
5 haven't cited them, but I'm happy to provide them to the Court 
6 and Counsel. Any time we get called desperate, you know, it's 
7 fair game to show that well, gee, that's funny because so far all 
8 the judges we've presented this theory to have agreed with us. 
9 THE COURT: What factually do we have here beyond that 
10 Sorensen is the general contractor that commends their liability? 
11 MS. PORTER: They did a couple of things. First they 
12 created a dangerous condition on the premises. Remember we're 
13 I talking about an actual physical condition on the premises, i.e., 
14 I way too close, built this thing way too close to power lines. 
15 Now they say — 
16 THE COURT: Building the building too close it was. 
17 MS. PORTER: Yes, physically. In fact, Mr. Sorensen 
18 in his deposition was asked, "Well, did you know because of this 
19 configuration here that subcontractors were going to have to get 
20 within 10 feet of these live power lines to do their work?" 
21 "Yes." He completely admitted it. So that's the first thing, 
22 they created the dangerous; condition. 
23 Now we read in their reply memo, "Well, the city okayed 
24 this and yeah, vie didn't follow these plans, but we did follow 
25 I these plans. Our expert says this, our expert says that." 
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That's a flaming fact issue. If they can -- they can present 
to a jury if they think they had a good reason for building, 
constructing a building dangerously close to live power lines, 
they can take that to a jury. 
The second things is -- so first they create the hazard. 
Second, they allow invitees to be on the premises without taking 
affirmative steps to protect them. Now we quoted at length from 
Hale vs. Beckstead where the Utah Supreme Court went on and on 
about the different duties that are owed to invitees. It's 
undisputed that subcontractors and employers are invitees. 
You have to under the conditions we laid out in our 
memo, and I won't belabor those given our time constraints, but 
you have to basically take affirmative steps -- reasonable steps 
to protect the invitees from these hazards. No one, by the way, 
has suggested it wasn't a hazardous condition. It was. 
Did they take any steps at all to provide invitees? No, 
which they admit. The closest I think they came in any of their 
deposition testimony was, "Well, we were going to. We were going 
to later. We were going to tell the individuals they needed to 
call Rocky Mountain Power." I think I saw that in some of the 
testimony they attached. 
Yet at the same time other testimony was by then -- by 
the time Mr. Gonzalez was injured, there had already been quite a 
few subcontractors, employees already working in that area near 
those power lines. So again, is the jury really going to believe 
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that he meant to do something and he would have done something? 
You know, that's a jury question. 
So we have creating a hazardous condition on the 
property, and then failing to take any steps, let alone 
reasonable steps, to protect invitees from that property. 
Now our expert -- or excuse me, that condition. 
Our experts gave some pretty easy examples. I mean 
they -- Sorensen could have put a sleeve on it, could have called 
Rocky Mountain Power like he was supposed it and had it shut down 
during periods of time or gone over the -- you know, et cetera. 
You know, those are the kinds of steps. They -- he didn't do any 
of that, not one thing. 
THE COURT: May I ask this? The liability stems from 
the fact that I as the general contractor that built a building 
that was too close to the power lines that created this hazard 
for subsequent work. 
MS. PORTER: Well, not subsequent work. This is work 
that is going while I'm still the general contractor, while I'm 
still --
THE COURT: Well, I mean subsequent to building the 
building. 
MS. PORTER: Oh, right. 
THE COURT: I suppose. 
MS. PORTER: Or either subsequent to or in conjunction 
with. I mean if you -- the building may be done on other parts 
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1 or may be done on this part, but the fact is that it has to be --
2 they know that workers are going to be on this part and it's too 
3 I close. That -- and remember, this -- we're talking about 
4 liability because of their status of a general contractor. The 
5 I general contractor owes the same duties under 384 which every 
6 single Court to look at has adopted, and one of those is to take 
7 the affirmative steps to protect people. We even laid it out, 
8 I you know, for them, and they haven't disputed, by the way, that 
9 those would have been reasonable steps and that they didn't take 
I 0 any of them. 
II So this is really a classic premises liability case. 
12 So what do we get? We get, ''Well, we didn't know you were 
13 pleading -- you were arguing premises liability. We thought you 
14 were arguing vicarious liability." You know what's ironic here? 
15 Look at our complaint. Look for the words vicarious liability in 
16 here that they claim they thought we were pleading. It's not in 
17 here. 
18 Every allegation we have against Sorensen is negligence. 
19 We don't ever allege vicarious liability in here, and they say, 
2 0 "But that's the only theory you should look at, your Honor. You 
21 I know, we want you to assume that's what they're pleading even 
22 though it's not in here, and don't let them actually point to 
23 [what is in here." 
24 I Our very first cause of action, very first sentence in 
25 I our cause of action is an allegation that the defendants were 
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1 negligent because they -~ the property -- I'll get to that. 
2 That's apparently the word we didn't use right, because we said 
3 that they failed to maintain the place of employment which was 
4 free from recognized hazards that were likely to cause death or 
5 serious physical harm to individuals working on the property. 
6 I That's paragraph 28 of our amended complaint, our very first 
7 statement there. 
8 Now their argument apparently is, "Well, it says 
9 property, it didn't say premises, so we didn't realize property 
10 could be premises." Is that what their argument is, because I 
11 could not find any case law under Rule 8 that says we have to 
12 I cite our case law, or even that we have to cite restatement 
13 provisions. We said you have a hazardous condition to 
14 individuals working on the property. That is a classic premises 
15 liability claim. 
16 I I don't honestly see how they can say that -- I mean 
17 I I would be a little embarrassed if I were defense Counsel five 
18 years after Hale came down and said, "Gee, we didn't realize that 
19 I a general contractor," which by the way --
2 0 THE COURT: Let me -- in Hale the dangerous condition 
21 I was what ? 
2 2 MS. PORTER: The dangerous condition is the proximity of 
23 the area where the invitees were going to be to a live wire. Now 
24 that could have been rectified by, for example, making the wire 
25 I not live or insulating that portion of the wire. So it is -- we 
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1 I know the invitees are going to be right here, and we know there's 
2 a live wire practically within arm's length of that. That is a 
3 I dangerous condition on the property -- on the premises. 
4 See, one thing that we keep hearing is -- well, for 
5 I example, we heard the facts in Magana. That just shows it right 
6 there. Magana, if I remember correctly -- and I did look at the 
7 I complaint they attached -- dealt with operation of a drill. It 
8 did not deal with an actual, you know, condition on the property. 
9 I Then they say, "They didn't mention premises liability in 
10 Magana." Well, I'd be surprised if they did because that wasn't 
11 the form of negligence alleged in Magana. 
12 We alleged negligence. We used the negligence term. We 
13 used the individuals working on the property. I mean should we 
14 have said premises? Okay. We can -- you know, but get out a 
15 thesaurus for goodness sake. Don't try to say, "We were 
16 completely caught by surprise." 
17 So the fact is -- oh, then there's one other I think 
18 allegation. They say well, we didn't allege that they were 
19 I controlling the property, but we actually did allege -- remember, 
20 all Rule 8 requires is notice pleading and inferences. You know, 
21 if you're confused, why didn't they send us -- if they didn't 
22 I know what we were alleging, why didn't they send us any 
23 interrogatories or something that said -- we didn't get any 
24 contention interrogatories in this case. We didn't get word boo 
25 that said, "We don't know what your theory is." They didn't pick 
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1 up the phone to say, "What's your theory?" What it is is they 
2 don't like premises liability because they are dead on that 
3 I c 1 a i m . 
4 I So instead, they're trying to force us to make a claim 
5 that we haven't made since 2005.. We specifically referenced to 
6 the fact that Sorensen was acting as the general contractor for 
7 [ the development of the property and for the project, which were 
8 I defined terms, and they admitted it. As far as we were 
9 I concerned, that issue was done. They admitted it and we moved 
10 on. We talk about hazardous condition in virtually every single 
11 I deposition. They don't claim otherwise. 
12 I The suggestion that we had to plead Hale vs. Beckstead 
13 in our complaint, I dare them to show me a case that says that. 
14 I We said negligence. We said hazardous conditions on the 
15 I premises, or (inaudible) property. That should have done it. 
16 I Given our time constraints, your Honor, unless the Court --
17 THE COURT: Well, you have about one minute left. 
18 MS. PORTER: Oh, all right. Well, in that case I'm 
19 I going to point out a few other things. The -- I'd mention that 
20 they both created and allowed the hazardous condition to maintain 
21 and that they failed to take any steps. There was a -- we 
22 actually addressed a lot of this. 
23 I We laid out quite a few of the facts. In fact, you'll 
24 notice that we successfully, in my view, disputed almost every 
25 one of their facts, and their only response and reply was, "Well, 
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1 those were irrelevant facts that we asserted." We agree, 
2 actually, because it was an irrelevant theory they were arguing. 
3 We also think John Clayton, to the extent that it added 
4 anything different in his factual allegations, we agree with 
5 I those, and we would incorporate those. The fact is we pled under 
6 I any reasonable interpretation of that pleading of Rule 8, we've 
7 I pled and we have given you tons of facts, most of which are 
8 undisputed as to the premises liability of Sorensen Construction. 
9 THE COURT: In sum, though, you -- if I understand you 
10 I correctly in terms of what you agree here also is it's really a 
11 premises liability analysis that is what you're advancing as 
12 I opposed to a dispute with the contact that Sorensen has with the 
13 subcontractors? 
14 MS. PORTER: Right. I mean inherently they forced 
15 the subcontractors to work in an extremely dangerous condition. 
16 That's not really the same thing as contacting. They didn't tell 
17 I them how to hold their, you know, torches or how to hammer. They 
18 didn't tell them any of that stuff, and we're not claiming that. 
19 What they did was they did actually force them to work around an 
20 extremely dangerous condition. 
21 We know from Hale that it's not good enough to say, 
22 I "Well, that was their choice," or, "Well, the employee was 
23 negligent or the employee's boss was negligent." The Supreme 
24 I Court in Hale said, "Whoa, whoa, those are all fact issues. 
25 J That's all comparative fault." 
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1 So yeah, our theory -- we haven't pled vicarious 
2 liability. That's why it's kind of insulting for them to keep 
3 telling you that's all we've pled. It's not in their complaint 
4 anywhere. 
5 THE COURT: I understand your position. 
6 MS. PORTER: Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. The time has expired, and I'm 
8 I going to take the matters under advisement. I appreciate --
9 yeah, I'll take the matter under advisement. I appreciate all 
10 your efforts. Thank you. 
11 MS. PORTER: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 MR. BLACK: Your Honor, regarding those other matters, 
13 I what we'd like to know is are you going to consider those on the 
14 written memorandums, or are we to have oral argument on those? 
15 THE COURT: Let me -- I note that -- in fact, let me 
16 see here. I made note here on the -- there were five motions, 
17 I and on the 16th of July, which is the same date -- I guess this 
18 was connected with your notice to submit. Was there a request 
19 for oral argument made by any -- either -- any of the parties? 
2 0 I MR. BLACK: I think we were asking for oral argument 
21 for -- if it was to be for the Court to happen at this time, 
22 obviously leaving that to your discretion as to whether to hear 
23 them now. 
24 THE COURT: Well, it was now, but I mean is the notice 
25 to submit or the motions themselves -- the memoranda -- request 
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oral argument? 
MR. BLACK: That was my intent. If it was left out, I'd 
request that now. 
THE COURT: Well, it's been my procedure here that -- my 
policy that if the parties request oral argument I grant it. 
MR. BLACK: Very well. 
THE COURT: But we're not able to -- at this point to 
schedule the hearing on that. Let me take a look at -- I do have 
the notice to submit, and that was one thing I was going to 
indicate. There is a notice to submit, and so it is handled in 
due course. We'll arrange to set it for -- Nicki's going to say 
something to me that --
(Court confers with court clerk) 
THE COURT: Nicki reminds me that I had broached the 
subject with her and we decided to take a minute or two here, see 
if we couldn't schedule it if everyone is prepared to schedule 
it. 
MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, may I add just one other 
thing, at the risk of being presumptuous. We had gone to the 
effort -- and it's been no small effort because of the number of 
parties -- to schedule mediation, and that's scheduled for July 
20th --
MS. PORTER: August 20th. 
MR. BARRETT: August 20th, sorry. August 20th, a little 
(inaudible). I think that this particular issue between Sorensen 
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1 (inaudible) is pivotal if that's going to be successful, and I 
2 know there's heavy demands on the Court's calendar, but I just 
3 want to make the Court aware of that. 
4 THE COURT: All right. That's -- when is your 
5 I mediation? 
6 MR. BARRETT: August 20th. 
7 THE COURT: August 20th. All right. As I say, my 
8 question is is in terms of these five motions, which there is a 
9 I notice to submit, we thought we might see if you're in a position 
10 to take just a minute here and with everyone present and try to 
11 I schedule that. Is everyone in a position to do that? 
12 MR. CURTIS: Sure. 
13 THE COURT: All right. 
14 MR. ROSE: Your Honor, could I just make one comment? 
15 Rick Rose on behalf of Pacific Corp. One of the motions that 
16 John Clayton has filed that I don't think is subject to that 
17 notice to submit is a motion for summary judgment on Pacific 
18 Corp's indemnity claim. We intend in the next about a week or so 
19 I to file an opposition to that and a cross motion for indemnity 
20 against the other parties. 
21 So I don't know if you want to -- as we're talking about 
22 scheduling a hearing date to include that in that hearing, or 
23 even have yet a third hearing. I just wanted to raise the issue 
24 that we do anticipate there being motions for summary judgment 
25 filed on Pacific Corp's indemnity claim -- third party indemnity 
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1 claim. 
2 THE COURT: Well, let me say this. I want to do that 
3 in just a minute or two if we can do it. If we can't do it in a 
4 minute or two, we will find some other way to do it, but I think 
5 I we need to schedule a hearing and give you sufficient time, but 
6 if it's going to be an omnibus hearing all pending motions, then 
7 I'm willing to do that. All pending motions? 
8 MR. BLACK: I did agree that the motion that Mr. Rose 
9 is talking about was my motion dealing with the High Voltage 
10 Overheard Lines Act. I'm certainly willing to have all those at 
11 the same time provided they have adequate time to respond. 
12 That's -- that I would give them. 
13 THE COURT: Well, we can set it that way, but I --
14 MR. BLACK: The sooner the better, but with the time 
15 that Mr. Rose needs to respond. 
16 THE COURT: Well, the argument there would be -- well, 
17 I want to be efficient with this, but I don't want to be in a 
18 situation in which we have so many motions, so many parties to be 
19 heard that everyone gets about three minutes. That's not very 
20 helpful to you or to me. 
21 MR. ROSE: I think it makes sense probably for our 
22 indemnity claim, let's just argue that separately. 
23 THE COURT: Well, that may be what I'm thinking 
24 here. So I think maybe these five motions outlined in your --
25 I Mr. Black, in your letter here of the 16th, or your request of the 
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1 16th, if we set that at one time, all five of those, that seems to 
2 make sense. Is everyone agreed to that? Does that make sense --
3 MR. BLACK: Yes, it does. 
4 THE COURT: -- to argue those five together. If I gave 
5 you 45 minutes? 
6 MR. ROSE: I need an hour, I think. 
7 THE COURT: An hour sounds good? I'll give you an hour. 
8 That needs to be sometime after -- oh, no, I guess at any time 
9 here that we can find an hour. What I'm going to have to do 
10 because of -- in terms of -- the calendar is pretty well filled 
11 up here, but any day at 1 o'clock, 1 to 2. Let me throw out 
12 Tuesday, August the 3rd. 
13 MR. BLACK: Tuesday, August 3rd. 
14 MS. PORTER: I think we can do that. We don't really 
15 have a bog in most of that pipe. 
16 THE COURT: Ail right. I am looking for (inaudible) 
17 Ms. Porter. 
18 MS. PORTER: Yeah. 
19 THE COURT: For those that -- 1 o'clock the 3rd of 
20 August, does that work for everybody -- for those --
21 MR. ROSE: August 3, not 3-0? August 3rd. 
22 THE COURT: August 3rd, which is Tuesday, 1 o'clock, 1 
23 hour, these five motions. Thanks for coming in. We'll send out 
24 notice of that to you. 
2 5 (Hearing concluded) 
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FILED 
MAR 0 3 Mi> 
41;i:; i/iu-.i'i;*.'! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
V 
GUADALUPE RUIZ ORDUNEZ, 
GUADALUPE ELEN LAZARO ROSALLS. 
and BEATRIZ CHAVEZ SANDOVAL, 
1 Plaintiffs, 
1 NEWELL K. WHITNEY, RISUN 
1 TECHNO! OGIES, and MUDDY BOYS, 
l> INC.. 
Defendants. 
i 
1
 s j P' 
Date: March 3, 2010 
Case No. 080400743 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 2 
The matters before the court are the motions r: *' K 
defendants Newell K. Whitney ("Newell Whitney"), Risui: I cchnoiogies inc r'kistm •and 
Muddy Boys, Inc. ("Muddy Boys"). Oral arguments were heard • \ !< ••, ^--i- np ; h •• . 
2010, at whicli time the court took the motions under advisement. The court now issues this 
decision denying the motions for the reasons set forth below. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant Newell K Whitney ("Newell Whitney") was building a home in Alpine ("the 
I lome") froi n 2005 to sometime in 2007, Newell Whitney was the owner of the Home as well as 
the general comrade «i *h<-. onstruction ^f the M-unc Defendant Risun Technologies, hie. 
K;;.un" ) is ouneu ; j . * '* nitncy New-, il \\ hniiev y. brother. Risi in drew up the plans for the 
Home and obtained the necessary building permits for it. Apparently when Newell Whitney was 
l\u-c 
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procuring subcontractors for the Home, he signed some of the contracts as "agent" of Risun. 
There is a dispute regarding whether Newell Whitney had any actual or apparent authority to act 
as an agent on behalf of Risun. In his capacity as general contractor on the Home, Newell 
Whitney hired Muddy Boys, Inc. ("Muddy Boys") to do the drywall in the Home. Muddy Boys, 
in turn, hired Allstate Drywall ("Allstate") to hang the drywall. Other subcontractors were hired 
to do the taping and texturing on the drywall 
The Home was approximately 13,000 square feet and included a four-story elevator shaft. 
On the morning of the accident, Newell Whitney told two Allstate Drywall employees to wrap an 
exposed beam and some television cable at the very top of the elevator shaft The two employees 
were Guadalupe Rosales and Ramon Aguirre. They apparently attempted to perform some work 
within the elevator shaft and were found a short time later at the bottom of the shaft in extremely 
critical condition and with injuries consistent with a long fall Ramon Aguirre was pronounced 
dead at the scene, and Guadalupe Rosales suffered severe, permanent injuries. Ramon Aguirre's 
wife, plaintiff Guadalupe Ordunez, filed suit against Newell Whitney, Risun, and Muddy Boys 
(collectively "Defendants") in case number 080400076, which was assigned to this court. 
Plaintiffs Guadalupe Rosales and his wife plaintiff Beatriz Chavez Sandoval (all plaintiffs 
collectively "Plaintiffs") also filed suit against Defendants in a separate case, case number 
080400743, which was assigned to Judge Taylor. Both cases asserted causes of action for 
negligence against Defendants. On July 15, 2008, this court signed an order of reinstatement and 
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consolidation ordering that case 080400076 be consolidated with case number 080400743. Rule 
;>uV2io!-fw i !Rc "*> t.\........ (;,. ' .- ' . lu^k.; -o; ' • '>• • i!- nak'o assignee ..- UK r : 
case, which is this court. - • • 
O r , X - M - ,• I ; M ' • " * * » \ ' " - i ^ - - : . . • - l • . i .• . j . j i H ^ h ; i o ' b 
opposed the motion and Newel! Whitney filed his reply and a request to submit the motion »UJ 
• l-'-ri^iiv. u " ' i : .•!' . . -• < '• •,- -t •;., •.• \] iKj -<v . ,.,. r E-. uin-'u'r. ud^ment, 
and on October 26, Risun moved (or summary judgment. \!' three defendants argued that 
sui i m^1* >' '* ••"•i* p - o ^ - 'i 'di-'.Mi: " ;, ,;*(.-. ritrol ovci the i i letl i.od that 
caused Plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs opposed the motions hied bv Risun and Muddy Bovs. and 
»<* i n n . " . : • i .i 1 ,- .!.; ^' :_, ; . » { * • .1 , ^ " ; n a i t ; u n i e » " -i \ o . 
Boys filed a reply on January 29, 2010. [lie court heard oiai arguments on all three motion? -m 
February I. 
DISCUSSION 
The ntnlions foi «;nntinan mdgmenl filed hv flic Defendant are denied, Rule ,So of'lht 
I Jtah Rules of c ivil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment and states that the court 
shall grant suumuirv judgment iHhe mo\ ing pnrt) show- uIh ii tin n r, no genuine issut of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ, 
P. 56(c) (2009). In addition, "|t)he party moving loi snmni.n'^ pidgincm has the burden of 
presenting evidence that no genuine issue of material fact exists." Uintah Basin Med, Ctr. v. 
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Hardy, 2008 UT 15, \ 16,179 P.3d 786 (citing Rule 56(e)). The Utah appellate courts have 
made clear that "the nonmoving party is entitled to all inferences arising from the facts of 
record." Id at % 18 (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 10, 48 P.3d 235). Pursuant to 
this standard, the court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the 
court from granting summary judgment to any of the Defendants. Specifically, the court 
concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Newell Whitney's duty of care 
as a possessor of land. There are also genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Risun 
and Muddy Boys were possessors of the land under a premises liability analysis. Therefore, 
summary judgment is not proper and the motions are denied. 
Plaintiffs concede that none of the Defendants are liable for negligence under a retained 
control theory of negligence, but they assert that this theory of negligence is irrelevant to their 
case pursuant to Magana v. Dave Roth Const., 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143. In Magana, the Utah 
Supreme Court explained, "The retained control doctrine is separate and distinct from a direct 
negligence theoiy. Specifically, the retained control doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff 
alleges that an employer's own actions were negligent." Id. at |^ 37. 
Plaintiffs assert that they are pursuing each of the Defendants for direct negligence on the 
basis of premises liability as set forth in Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263, and §§ 
343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under this theory of negligence, a 
possessor of land is liable for physical harm caused to invitees by dangers on his land only under 
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specified circumstances. Specifically, section 343, entitled "Dangerous Conditions Known to or 
'• v < ) \ i f a ' * ' -\ I 'M* v.- . i • • ^ l e s , 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical hai m caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care 
would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of 
harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable 
care to protect them against the danger. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343. Sir nilarly, the rele\ ai it poi tioi I of section 343 • \ 'Ki icivv i i 
or Obvious Dangers ," provides. "(V* A possessor nf land n n^t nabie to his invitees ior physical 
harm caused to them by an \ u ^ •• • • . .<i.*n •• ^ - • - l ; : ! - ^ -,.-...•, . ? • • 
to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness." Id. at § 343A. 
The court in Hale explained that the open and obvious danger rule as set forth- i; sections 
343 and 343 A of the Restatement was the applicable law in ... a--, v. ht i,- !. ••• i . : 
painter working for the defendant owner of the home who w d$ aiso the general contractor. 2005 
U'l 24, • *• : '\r plaintiff in Hale waspaint im' a v^-'u- *i. • •'rnd.in' '• •• 
second lioo: ^i UK lu^ne. Id. at f 3 A railing had not been installed on the seconu iioor 
balcony, and the plaintiff stepped off the balcony when painting and was injured. Id. In further 
explaining tlic open and obvious danger rule, the court explained, "[I]t is a duty-defining rule that 
srmply states that, under appropriate circumstances, a landowner ' s duty of care might not include 
warning or otherwise protecting visitors from obvious dangers ." Id. at 1[ 23.. The court stated, 
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"[T]he law simply requires owners to take reasonable steps to protect invitees. This duty does 
not require that landowners fully remedy potentially unsafe conditions, only that landowners 
adequately warn invitees about such dangers." Id. at % 30. The court then held that the grant of 
summary judgment was premature because "the Restatement rule requires an inquiry into 
whether factors existed to vest in the defendant a duty to warn or otherwise protect the plaintiff 
from an obvious harm[ J" and the facts regarding this inquiry were not developed below. 
In support of their argument that all Defendants were possessors of land under the open 
and obvious danger rule, Plaintiffs cite to section 384 of the Restatement. Section 384 provides, 
"One who on behalf of a possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition on the 
land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from liability, as though he 
were the possessor of the land, for physical harm caused to others upon and outside the land by 
the dangerous character of the structure or other condition while the work is in his charge." 
Restat. 2d Torts § 384. Comment d to this section clarifies the application of this rule to 
contractors and subcontractors and states, "in such a case, the rule stated in this Section applies 
to subject the particular contractor or subcontractor to liability for only such harm as is done by 
the particular work entrusted to him." Id. at comment d. 
Neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly adopted 
this section, but Plaintiffs argue that it applies to render each of the Defendants "possessors of 
land" within the meaning of the open and obvious danger rule. It appears that there are genuine 
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issues of material fact regarding which of the Defendants were in charge of the elevatoi shaft. It 
is the pi <:n ii ice of tl le f indei of fact to ciciei i nine wl lich ol the Defendants wei e "possessors" of 
the elevator shaft foi purposes of premises hahlil\ uul if 'lies' look reasonable steps le 
adequatelyprouxi iiK w : v^ • :-MI •" •. -.t .-u r- .\. i 
judgment are denied. • • 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' inotions for summary judgment are denied. The court concludes that there 
are issues ; ..-.aieju.j i;iei f- JMUIII-J1 ui • ' *><- i >• :.*r«ci.. ' -<••• \-^ -ussors of the ele \ ator 
shaft for purposes of premises habdiiv JM: \vhrthet 'hey took reasonable steps to protect workers 
in that area. Therefore, the motions aie denied ( Ymnscl tot Pbintifi shall prcpau: an ,'ippiopnaU 
order consistent with this decision for signature by the court 
-7 A ^ 
DA'I"ED tl lis g> ^day of Mmvtt, ."> I " 
Steven L. Hansen 
District Court. Judge 
Case No. 080400743 
I >age 7 oi 7 
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MAY 2 6 2010 
hlfc .'.wM'J&i District 
IN T H E THIRD M IM4 l.\l DISIRI t I ( Ol Rf 
SALT LAKE COl.N IT , STA'I I- O M I'AII . _ 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMEN I 
t-A y^ <> J> ?r-^ 
^ M.I LSlsE U O U i \ I ^ 
MATT CHRISTENSEN, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
J ... H A K U V CONSTRUCTION COMI'A.s-. aKa 
! ! HARDY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 090906593 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
Date: May 25, 2010 
rhi^ matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Havme »M11J 
considered trie arguments, Ine Moiiuu i, uKA.\ i f ; ) IN !' \K \ ,-i I j -..\ir.D IN I'AK I ^peo;ik,aii\ ihe 
< ;iurt agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs' vicarious liability theorv of "retained controPfails. However, 
F:;imuns may proceed u> tna! on iheir two theories oi direct l u ^ n r . 
This cast' involves an accident at a constmotion site Plaintiff, Matt Christensen, was injured when 
1 ic fell approximately 12 feet down an open staii we he ! m:c i •: \: : i iu ni istensen was working on 
the Prime Business Center construction project Defendant, J.I Hardy Construction, had been hired to be 
the general contrau ioi me piojeci. PeienuaM .^ i MIVU i c n e i U:CK as a .-.tnconiKsc • : \-. ;rame :he 
building. Christensen worked for Cobble Creek as the project manager over this project.1 
Mi l . -J! [.'IK' f ; . 1 * 5 #r K H C !: ' ' , { 1 M I M C U M ' : ' m . i;i JC4- i ' i m n l s f i s -i* - ; i -
negligence. The first two are direct ilegligencc theories: (1) that Defendant is liable as a possessor of the 
*At the hearing, Defendant presented copies of deposition testimony which h;ui nut txc-n 
attached to any of the memoranda regarding this Motion. Defendant argued that tins testimony was 
material to the determination of the Motion. Plaintiffs objected. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs 
that it was improper for Defendant to rely upon new evidence at the hearing. Although Defendant 
argues that Plaintiffs' counsel was already aware of the deposition tesdmony, Defendant did not give 
Plain ri f fs an appropriate op p o 11 u 1111 y to p r e p a re to me e t th e pro f fe red tes timoiiy. 1 'h ere fore, th e 
Court dues not consider the new evidence 
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CHRISTENSEN V J.L. HARDY PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
land and (2) Defendant is liable for interfering with Christensen's work and forcing him to work in unsafe 
conditions. Plaintiffs third theoiy is that Defendant is liable under the indirect negligence theoiy of 
"retained-control." In bringing this Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on any of the 
alternative theories of liability. Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot prove the cause of 
Christensen's injuries because there were no witnesses to the accident and Christensen himself does not 
remember the accident. 
L Direct Negligence 
A. Possessor of Land 
Plaintiff and Defendant disagree over whether Defendant can be held liable for failing to protect 
Christensen against the open and obvious harm of the hole. The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff can 
proceed on this theory of negligence. 
The Utah Ccse that governs this issue is Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263.2 In Hale, 
the court adopted the Restatement Second of Torts §§ 343 and 343 A. Section 343 provides: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by 
a condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to 
protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
Restat 2d of Torts, § 343. This section is read together with Section 343 A, which provides: 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them 
by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, 
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
Plaintiffs also cite Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628. However, the supreme 
court case overruled die court of appeals case in part and so this Court will rely on the supreme 
court case to establish the rule. 
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CHRISTENSEN V J.L. HARDY PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
obviousness. 
(2) In determining WIIL I possessor should aniicip >wn or 
obvious danger, the faci inai me invitee is entitled to mai /_ „;
 r-uLi^ tana, or of 
the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm 
should be anticipated, 
R estatemei it 2< i of 1 oi ts, § 3- 13 A 
In discussing these sectioi is, Hale said, "the Restatement sections 343 and 343 A , ..(lefin.es 
! > '' « } r > ^- • o l t '-' • i s s < 1 - - r i r - S . ^ C U v • ' *' i t . 
Where an im itee is injured by a condition on land iioin wlrt h the possessor did m-i owe a tint> 'u 
- r p f 0 ( t ' h , '.. > • : - . . ., • •• . • H ^ h j R M - M * " ' ' - ' / . M l ' . * ' ! M \\ < n " A T : ' 
invitee's attention may be distracted, such that he will not discover what hi;- obvious, o* cd! ' n : *< 
r t - 1 ;» • - • 1 - • i • • • ' • : •• • ' ! ! ' ! ' ' * ' i - ' • ' ' • > O f ' . ' ' U , . -
breaching his duty of care it he tails to wain M to lake MLei • teps to protn i |the -initeel." id 
* o i . ( ' ^ , ' - . i * !• • • ! ; ! ( * «* . . .• i . i » * : •! K e ^ t < i i f - c i - 1 { 
1 orts § 384, a contractor is iieated as a possessoi oi hud it n 'civets a slmcture or creates an othei 
,'5iM i • -. , !»; :.'':.] v. ,.ic y • M' ,:i eeptaiu t- ^\i • • •• h ^ 'i * i* • >r ' ^ ^ ^•'! ' 
idopted in Utah. Sec SmitJwy v Suave ( '^tisiruenan ( 7;.s UK)'/ I- S. Dist. LHX1S ^8 I (' > N j> 
2007) ('V\t least twenty-one other states, including several m this ;c.p I on. iiave followed r -co ; • 
law rule contained in § 384 and stated that a contractor working on behalf of a landowner stands m 
the landowner's shoes for purposes of premise liability."). 
The Court is persuaded that it is appropriate to rely on Restatement 2d, Torts, § 384, and find 
that Plaintiffs can proceed !<- -\ miv u- v> -n this theory of liability. As referenced above, tlus 
approach is widely accepted ,n other |uiisdictions. Additionally, it reflects the sound policy that 
when the owner of property has relinquished control of his/her property to a general contractor, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CHRISTENSEN V J.L. HARDY PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
general contractor must then be responsible for the conditions it creates on the land. 
In the present case, there are clearly questions of fact regarding whether Defendant had a duty 
to protect Christensen from the hole into which he fell. First, the parties dispute who created the 
hole. Defendant says that Cobble Creek had placed the floor joists and covered them with flooring, 
leaving an opening for the stairwell Further, Defendant asserts that Cobble Creek had a contractual 
obligation to ensure the safety of the stairs. Section 2.8 of the contract between Cobble Creek and 
Defendant reads in part: 
SUBCONTRACTOR, ITS AGENT, EMPLOYEES, MATERIALMEN AND 
LOWER TIER SUBCONTRACTORS SHALL PERFORM HIS WORK IN A SAFE 
MANNER; (1) TO COMPLY WITH PREVAILING SAFETY REGULATIONS, 
INCLUDING THE APPLICABLE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT 
AND THE CURRENT REGULATIONS ADOPTED THEREUNDER, (2) TO 
PROVIDE SAFE TOOLS'AND EQUIPMENT, (3) TO HOLD WEEKLY SAFETY 
MEETINGS, (4) TO INSTALL BARRICADES, SIGNS, FLAGS, LIGHTS AND 
OTHER SAFE GUARDS TO PREVENT INJURY TO WORKERS AND OTHERS 
ON OR ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, . . . . 
Plaintiffs counter that Cobble Creek did not cover the stairwell because it was directed not to do so 
by the plans and specifications. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that another subcontractor installed 
the steel beams/columns for the stairwell and Cobble Creek just built around those. Plaintiffs say 
that the open stairwell was in a common area, to which multiple subcontractors/workers were 
exposed. Even though Cobble Creek had to perform its own work safely, it was not responsible for 
erecting barriers around hazards that it did not create and which posed risks to all workers on the job 
equally. Plaintiffs, therefore, assert that it was Defendant's responsibility to keep the open stairway 
safe based on the provisions of the contract between Defendant and Prime Business Center LLC 
wherein Defendant accepted responsibility for "safety control55 and "supervision" at the job site. 
The Court disagrees with Defendant's assertion that the open and obvious doctrine does not 
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apply to general coi ltractor/si ibcoi ltractoi i elatioi ishipsil id Jta h Defe ndai it says tl miDi lyiom » P > eey 
148 P. 408 (I Jtah 1914) and Thompson v. less, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322,. hold that the open and. 
c I)1 ""ions docti ine doesn' t apply to coi ltractors. I Iowever those cases are i lot directly on poii it 
Thompson clearly says that sections 413,416, and 427 of the Restatement Second o f Forts "have no 
application wl leu the In...]t ireci persoi i. is an eiiiployee of tl le indepei ident contractoi i indertaking tl :te 
allegedly dangerous work." 1999 UT 22 at *p0. Thompson does not discuss whether sections 343 
held that the owner "having neither reserved nor exercised dneetion or control over the work ot ihc 
•i • ; -j » n a • i- i * t i u p i :' < 
notify him ofmissed holes, or to iniaid against dangers incident to or created hv the pivsecution *tf 
t l l e W O i !• * r • .: • : ' ' : : • • I . 11 • - t\> a s: . .V t i [ - • x^y. 1 1 : t • r * ] •: - A I ' • • ' 1 1 1 . •! • •*' i • 
him or wit!1 v,» .mi lit* laho'vd " 148 P 4UK a 4 i,!. ikivlo*! did not discuss a genera! ^ oniric tof 
liabil.it..)' to a si ibeontractor, on.l> ai i owner's liabilit] to a gei leral coi ltractoi I c the extent that 
Dayton is inconsistent with Hale, Hale supercedes Dayton. 
• :" • • : "••!( : ia\' .TM-I r: M ' . * K ---.t -'IS P * * : • -. • 
\lihough the ('ourt has determined ihat n Aas- improper ior Defendant to present new arguments at 
- h . - h i
 ; j t MI ' * ' - i ' < : " ( • , • t h a t > - ' / ; F / . • - h ! ' • h " 
n-iuilh In English, the ^PUM held that "xvnon M * and v| v\ o\ ihr Restatement Second ot D>Js 
; O I ' N n « » t i*v It
 : * 5, !: ;, • , i , -; t\ t ' J \> \ ' • ; - - \ • = . . • ' , / . . *'" | 1 - >j r - t ] w I i • . iT t * . ; i It ^ ' " i - -i | 
regarding who created, the li.aza.rd. 
B* Interference with Job Duties 
Plaintiff alleges that the direct negligence alleged against Defendant relates to Defendant's 
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"affirmative actions that forced Matt to build the wall in question in a way that was less safe. But 
for J.L. Hardy's actions, Matt would have build the wall in a manner that not only would have been 
safer, but would have obviated the need for exposure to the open stairwell." Memo in Opp. at iv. 
The Court accepts that there are questions of fact regarding whether Defendant owed a duty to 
Plaintiff and whether Defendant breached that duty. Specifically, when the Court views the facts in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accepts all of the assertions in Plaintiffs' expert reports, it 
is possible to conclude that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff, that Defendant was negligent in its 
management of the construction site, specifically, the safety aspects, and that Defendant's negligence 
was a primary cause of Plaintiffs accident. This is sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
Z Retained Control 
Defendant argues that it did not exercise control or "retain control" over the injury-causing 
work. The Court agrees with Defendant. 
The "retained control" doctrine is discussed in the seminal case of Thompson v. Jess, 1999 
UT 22,979 P.2d 322. In Thompson, the defendant Jess contacted AmeriKan Sanitation and arranged 
for purchase and delivery of a large pipe. Id. at ^|2. When the AmeriKan employees, Dennis and 
Trevor Thompson, delivered the pipe., Jess asked them to install the pipe. Id. at p . Despite 
responding that they were not equipped to erect the pipe, Jensen agreed to install the pipe and then 
Jess went back inside. Id. at ffl|4-5. Jensen and Thompson attempted to install the pipe and 
Thompson was injured in the process. Id. at ^|5. The court then discussed whether Jess would be 
liable for Thompson's injuries. 
The Thompson court discussed the "retained control" theory by noting that "Utah adheres to 
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the general common law rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable f 01 plnxj. al 
harm, caused by another by an act or omission of the contractor of his servants," Id. tt *: h i • \-
general rule recognizes that one >\h< .;•• . .;denendent contract* ai\! dor- roi -\ •: MV.' 
control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the 
safety of the manner or method of performance implemented."' Id Nevertheless, the 7 Iwmp son 
court noted that there are exceptions to the general commoi 1 law rule, and that "retained control" 
is a narrow theory of liability applicable in the unique circumstance where an 
employer of an independent contractor exercises enough control over the contracted 
work to give rise to a limited duty of care, but not enough to become an employer or 
master of those over whom the control is asserted. The duty is such situations is one 
of reasonable care under the circumstances and is confined in scone lo the control 
asserted. 
- a j it 1|15. 
The Thompson coin t adopted the "active participation* standard to dct'-nninc a -n 
. tup-Clio;-!*, :• -A .. I •.•u'li vi jM'i; " - ' ••• -\ \ i:»-. a >. \ ••: i 'a*, ei the 'active 
participatioi. standard, a p:mcipal emplover is subject to -ubdih tm injuries arising out of its 
H . C i J C i l t J . ; : : •• ' • - . - ' , * n '• ' ; r • > .
 ; ] • • . ' ; , . . . • 
manner of performance of tlu \ ontiacled woi k " id at <il^ Bxamplesof such control o« eui ulu-n 
the pr i nci pal en i pi oyer c 1 i reel s tl i at 11 ie con t r ac ted wo r k b e d on e fay \ i se o f a certai n n i ocl c oi otliei \ < r i se 
interferes with the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished." Id. (internal 
c itatioi is on litted). 1 1 ie cca in t ultii i lately determh led that Jc; .ss had i lot activel) pai ticipated in the 
manner or method of performance and, consequently, was not liable to rhompson. Hie court 
reasoned that u[a]fter agreeing to erect the pipe, Jensen, nol fess, detet i nine dthen ietl ic> if c: i bi ingii ig 
about the desired result. ., . . "1 he only control Jess exerted was in directing that the pipe be installed 
over the pipe sti lb I his an 101 inted n lei eiy to control ovei the desired resi ill " h / at f]24. 
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The "retained control doctrine" has been clarified by subsequent cases. In Magana v. Roth 
Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143, the court stated, "the question of whether an employer 
actively participated is not simply whether an employer participated in an injury-causing activity, 
but whether the employer controlled the means and methods by which the injury-causing activity was 
performed." Id. at ^31. The court went on to say, that, regardless of whether the contractor had 
controlled some aspects of the subcontractor's work, the contractor had to "exert sufficient control 
over the independent contractor such that [the contractor cannot] cany out the injury-causing aspect 
of the work in its own way." Id. at |^27 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, the aspect 
that the contractor controls must be the proximate cause of the injury. Id. The court also rejected 
the plaintiffs argument that Campbell's general responsibility for safety at the site constituted 
"active participation." The Magana court stated that "a general obligation to oversee safety on a 
project does not equate to exerting control over the method and manner of the injury-causing aspect 
of the [sub-contractor's] work." Id. at^|29 (citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 
In Begaye v. Big D Construction Corp., 2008 UT 4, 178 P.3d 343, the court determined that 
when the contractor "controlled the sequence of the task, as well as the workflow generally, but it 
had no discretion or control regarding the specifics of how [the wall] was built or which bracing 
method was used," this was insufficient to prove retained control. Id. at ^ [11. Additionally, although 
the contractor ordered the subcontractor to build the wall "when it could have sent the employees 
home for the day or sent them to work on another wall, such discretion is insufficient to bring it 
within the scope of the 'active participation' standard." Id. at ^ |12. 
In the present case, even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff 
simply cannot show that Defendant "retained control" over the injury-causing activity. It is 
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i indisputed that Defendant i icvei oi dei ed Cobble Creek tc : bi nld 1:1 le i vail in a cei tain inai iner. 
Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant should be held vicariously liable for the injury suffered 
becai ssethe coi nbined effect of all of Defendant's actions (lea1* 'ing the trench open, placii igdii thills 
in inconvenient places, requiring Cobble Creek to keep working or be replaced) effectively 
controlled Plaii itiffs actions to tl le extent that Plaintiffs were forced to perfon n theii • oi: k ii i an 
unsafe manner. While these arguments may be presented under a direct negligence theory, as a 
ii latter of la * the y :1c :ir: :>l establish that Defei idant actively participated ii I directing the ii lji ii y-
causing aspect of the work The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs' claim under the "retained 
conti oi" theoi y fails. 
3. Causation 
prove vvhal caused it 1 his argument lacks merit. 1 hough Plamtiils may noi have evidence of 
- ft ilv !>• •• : i.-i; . :. . KII pa- 1 •' • • J ; ' •- •>• i iJ<.->i ili* • :• 
a tiv w-ul : here is no allegation that Chnstensen (a) jumped into the hole purposely. ;h) H-USU \ 
"\Miiinp when hr tc|l, >i (t i <va ; pudinl I In I uii'l cont ItuCs Ikt1 an lite hiel^ i ' flu1 ease, 
Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to take the causation issue to the fact-finder. 
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